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ABSTRACT
Like many manufacturers today, Ford Motor Company is under increasing pressure to produce
higher quality products with lower cost, and better delivery. Several strategies have been
developed to meet these new challenges. The demands of these strategies have made it
increasingly unattractive to ship parts from components plants to assembly plants by rail.
Although rail used to fit well with Ford's manufacturing strategy, the fit has been increasingly
poor in recent times.
This thesis describes and quantifies the nature of the poor fit between rail and Ford's new
strategies, and discusses the use of a customer needs analysis to determine ways to improve this
fit. The demands of lean production (in the form of the Ford Production System), synchronous
production (in the form of In-Line Vehicle Sequencing), and environmentally friendly material
handling are outlined in detail. The impact of each of these strategies on rail is also discussed.
Input from customers and users of rail transit is gathered through the use of a structured customer
needs analysis, and is used to generate recommended modifications to rail equipment and
logistics. The conclusion of this thesis is that the poor fit between rail and Ford's new strategies
arises primarily from a failure to apply lean techniques such as process mapping and waste
reduction to the rail system.
Thesis Supervisors: Daniel Whitney, Senior Research Scientist
Steven Eppinger, Associate Professor of Management
Donald Rosenfield, Senior Lecturer
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1. Introduction
1.1 The evolution of rail and the auto industry
Detroit is unique among American cities. A drive through the streets and along the highways of
the Detroit metropolitan area leaves no doubt as to where the city got its nickname "The Motor
City". Billboards advertise things like CAD/CAM systems, and rolled sheet steel. The streets have
names like The Edsel Ford Freeway, The Chrysler Freeway, and the Reuther Freeway. The
surrounding towns have names like Pontiac, Plymouth, and Cadillac. A 50 foot tire stands
alongside the interstate with the tire manufacturer's name in white neon. As Robert Lacey puts it,
"...This is the motor capital of the world. There are motor industries in Japan, Germany, Britain,
in every industrialized country, but they are scattered. Nowhere else have the car makers all
congregated in one single, grey, smokey location to build their cars together."'
It was not by coincidence that all of the US car manufacturers grew up and remain in southeastern
Michigan. Before highways and extensive railroads, Detroit's location on the river between two of
the great lakes made it easily accessible and attractive for industries which needed to ship material
over long distances. During its early settlement, Michigan's forests provided abundant hardwood
and her upper peninsula provided one of the largest iron ore deposits on earth.2 The abundance of
these two natural resources combined with the ease of shipping out of Detroit made the area a
prime location for carriage builders to set up shop. Machining and metal working shops grew in
Detroit as the need for parts for carriages, ships, railways, and a host of other industries grew. By
the 1890s Detroit had all of the ingredients to become the motor capital of the word- skilled labor,
natural resources, a good transportation system, and an existing "supply base".
As Ford enjoyed greater and greater success during the 1910s and 1920s, Henry Ford came to
believe that his supply base was too widely dispersed. He envisioned an industrial complex which
would take in sand, coal, and ore, and spit out finished vehicles. The Rouge was the realization of
this vision, and is still in use today. This highly centralized complex includes a steel mill, a glass
1 Lacey, 1986 p. xiv
2 Lacey, p 22
plant, a stamping plant, a frame plant, an engine plant, and an assembly plant. Such a structure
inherently reduces the cost of transporting parts into the assembly plant, and thus the incentive to
focus much management attention on inbound transportation.
It was a desire to reduce finished vehicle transportation costs which first led Ford to build remote
assembly plants. During the days of the Model T all of Ford's plants were building variations of
the same basic car. William Knudsen, one of Ford's top managers at the time, realized that it was
cheaper and more efficient to ship parts of vehicles than to ship fully assembled cars3. This led to
the construction of remote assembly plants. Kits of parts and partially assembled vehicles were
shipped to these remote locations for assembly. The vehicles would then be sold in the region in
which they were built. Rail provided a relatively inexpensive way to move large quantities of
material over longer distances.
When General Motors introduced the idea of the annual model change, the nature of the US auto
market began to change in ways that were to prove difficult for Ford to handle. As cars became
more fashion items and less purely utilitarian, customers came to want a choice in their vehicles. It
was no longer enough to have a sturdy, inexpensive Model T. A car company must now provide
vehicles to suit different price ranges and different tastes. The number of models a car company
produced grew, and the issue of plant complexity became of increasing importance.
In an effort to gain economies of scale within individual plants, and to reduce the complexity of
the tooling in each plant, auto companies eventually segregated auto production by plants. Today
most assembly plants make one or two vehicles, with the most complex of plants making seven
different vehicles. Auto companies continued to build assembly plants in locations relatively far
from Detroit to take advantage of local wage, tax, and other economic benefits. Component
plants were built in remote locations as well. The end result of the segregation in plant production
and the increased dispersion of plants was an increased requirement to transport both parts and
finished vehicles over long distances.
3 Lacey, p 288
Not only were large in-transit inventories required to fill the transportation pipelines in a dispersed
system, but large in-plant inventories were required to protect against variability in the transit
times. In the 1950s and 1960s, inventory was viewed as a benefit. It protected against unreliable
machinery, uncertain demand, and other variability including transit time variability. There was a
greater focus on supplying demand than on controlling inventory costs, so carrying large
inventories made sense.
During the 1970's and 1980's the US auto manufacturers increasingly lost market share and
profits to overseas competitors. Oil crises shifted demand away from large, high margin vehicles
to smaller, more fuel efficient, lower margin vehicles. Despite a long period of industry wide
denial, the US auto companies came to realize that their competitors, particularly the Japanese,
were doing business in a fundamentally different way.
In a book that changed the way many manufacturers viewed their business, Womack et.al. coined
the term "lean" manufacturing. They talked of removing waste from the manufacturing process,
and eliminating delays. Their work largely focused on improving operations within the walls of the
plant. Minimizing inventory, pulling material through the production process instead of pushing it,
and focusing on continuous improvement through employee involvement were cited as keys to
being a successful manufacturer. Today, many US manufacturers, including Ford, are
implementing ambitious programs to help make their plants lean.
What the Womack study did not really address was the issue of long distance transportation. The
Japanese, who were the benchmark for the book, were described as having modeled their supply
chains after Henry Ford's Rouge Complex. The idea was to locate suppliers and customers as
close as possible to each other to eliminate the wasted time and movement of transporting goods
over long distances. Unfortunately the US based operations within Ford had already invested
significantly in a widely dispersed supply base. In a rush to adopt lean thinking on the plant floor
the issue of how to make a dispersed supply network lean seemed to fall through the cracks.
The recent development of the Ford Production System, and an increased focus on total cost, are
bringing supply chain leanness to the forefront. With this increased focus on the supply chain as a
whole comes an increased focus on the logistics and equipment used to transport material through
the supply chain into the assembly plants. What we find when examining transportation logistics
and equipment is that there has been significantly more thought given to truck transportation than
to rail. In part this is attributable to the nature of the truck and railroad industries and the
competitive pressures each faces, and in part to deeply imbedded paradigms. What is clear is that
rail as a mode of transit has not evolved fast enough to keep up with the evolution in Ford's
manufacturing philosophy. The objective of this thesis is to examine why the logistics and
equipment of the railroads are an increasingly poor fit to Ford's needs, and to determine ways for
Ford to capitalize on the advantages of rail, while bettering rail's fit to current manufacturing
strategies.
1.2 Thesis Structure and Preview
To better understand this idea of the poor fit between rail as a mode of transportation and Ford's
new strategies we will begin with a brief description of how Ford came to view the fit with rail as
poor, as well as a basic description of the terminology and nature of the rail system. We will then
examine the specific elements of Ford's strategy which impact the appeal of rail as a mode of
shipment. We will also examine how Ford makes the truck vs. rail decision, and how railroad
companies view the auto parts business.
Once we have an understanding of Ford's high level strategic needs we will discuss the
application of a customer needs analysis as a tool for determining ways to improve the fit between
rail and the new strategies. We will see that this customer needs analysis indicated that the poor fit
exists both in the areas of rail equipment and rail system logistics. Each of these areas will be
discussed independently.
Regarding the logistics of the rail system, we will discuss three issues in depth: the process flows
for material and box car movement through the rail system; the pricing structure of rail
transportation; and issues of rail fleet capacity planning. Regarding the issues of rail equipment,
we will examine issues of equipment maintenance policies and the impact of creating unique
equipment designs. We will discuss recommended changes to both equipment and logistics design,
and reflect on the usefulness of applying a product design/customer needs analysis methodology
to a project internal to a company.

2. Background
In this chapter we will begin by outlining how Ford came to view the fit between rail transit and
new strategic initiatives as poor. Described below are the "symptoms" which led to the decision to
investigate major changes to rail shipping. Before we begin a more detailed analysis of the
problems of fit, we will briefly discuss the terminology and nature of the rail system and rail
equipment. Also included in this chapter is a literature search to familiarize the reader with
relevant research.
2.1 Poor "fit" between new strategies and rail shipment
As Ford moved to reduce inventories and make its plants more lean, more and more material was
shipped into the assembly plants by trucks, and less by rail. This trend seemed to emerge as a
result of individual plants and logistics planners making individual decisions, rather than as part of
a stated strategy. Plants complained of poor delivery reliability from rail, of problems with the
harshness of rail damaging parts in transit, and of problems with damaged or dangerous rail
equipment. Logistics analysts were under pressure to reduce pipeline inventories, and rail could
not offer the fast transits that truck could.
In the last six years 94 rail docks have been filled in in stamping and assembly plants alone.4 The
receiving capacity lost by these rail dock fill-ins must be made up in truck receiving docks. The
shift from rail to truck was slowed by the plants' inability to add more truck docks. In some cases
the entire perimeter of an assembly plant is now covered by truck docks. It is not unusual to see
several hundred truck trailers parked on the grounds of some assembly plants, waiting to be
unloaded. Clearly the problems rail presented could not be solved simply by eliminating inbound
rail altogether.
In an effort to reduce direct labor costs, many jobs within Ford's plants have been automated. In
the area of material handling, automated guided vehicles (AGVs) have replaced tug drivers, and
automated material replenishment systems have reduced the demand for fork truck drivers. At last
4 Ed Dietrich Presentation, 11/96
count, 30% of the material handling labor in Ford's North American assembly plants was devoted
to receiving material by rail and truck. Of this, 30% is devoted to receiving inbound rail, and the
remainder is dedicated to unloading trucks.5 Systems have been developed to automate the
unloading of certain types of inbound truck loads, and are currently in use on selected
commodities. At this time, the commodities that are automatically unloaded all arrive in
homogeneous loads (i.e. a truck contains one and only one type of commodity) and all arrive in
returnable containers, as opposed to cardboard boxes. There are no plants that automatically
unload rail cars. This condition gave rise to the idea of reexamining box car design with the end
goal of reducing labor costs through automation.
As inventories shrink, and synchronous material flow becomes a reality, the importance of
reliable, on time delivery increases. Ford has expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of service
from rail companies6 and there is a feeling within Ford that the railroads are not as responsive to
Ford's needs as many of the major trucking companies. Ford has also complained that not only
are rail delivery times unreliable, but the transit time is excessive. The length of time it takes to
move empty racks back from an assembly plant to a supplier plant is often more than twice the
length of time required to move the full racks from the supplier to the assembly plant. This
increases the amount of money Ford must invest in shipping containers (i.e. racks and packaging
materials) to fill the transit pipeline in both directions. These conditions together indicate the need
to examine the logistics of the rail system and determine how to make a better fit between the
logistics Ford envisions for a lean supply chain and the services the rail companies can provide.
Before we examine the issues noted above in more detail, it is useful to spend some time
understanding the basic nature and operation of rail shipment and the related equipment.
5 1992 Frank Payne material handling labor study. Spot verified and corrected to 1996 levels.
6 Ed Dietrich Presentation 11/96
2.2 Box car basics
Although it is not at all unusual to see rail tracks, rail yards, and locomotives in many towns and
cities, the nature of rail shipping remains a mystery to many. What follows is a very brief overview
of how the US rail shipping system works, and some of the related terminology.
There are two basic types of trains in the US rail system- passenger and freight. Each has one or
4; 1 11; rf(
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behind it. In passenger trains these cars are typically
air conditioned, lighted, heated, and well cushioned.
In freight trains these cars may be anything from a
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box on wneels to a pressure tanker. An increasing
segment of rail transport involves "intermodal" Figure 2-a - A typical Box Car
shipments. In such shipments a container may spend
some time attached to a rail car, some time stacked on a boat, and some time being pulled behind
a tractor trailer. For the purposes of this paper we will focus on box cars. A box car is a relatively
generic rail car, that functions as a large box on wheels. The sizes of today's box cars range from
50 feet long, 9 feet wide, and 10.5 feet high, to 86.5 feet long, 9 feet wide, and 12.75 feet high.
These cars typically have sliding doors on both sides in the center of the car.
Within the interior of the car there maybe dividers or load restraint devices which restrict the
movement of goods within the car. The two most common type of load restraints are bulkheads
and column load dividers. A bulkhead is a large panel that spans the cross section of the car.
Moveable bulkheads are typically hung from rollers in tracks along the ceiling of the car and can
be positioned anywhere along the length of the car. Column load dividers (CLDs) are essentially
I-beams hung from rollers in the intersection of the ceiling and side walls. These beams can be
positioned anywhere along the length of the car and locked into place. For safety reasons, Ford no
longer employs moveable bulkheads in any of its box cars.
Typical box cars have two sets of wheels each containing two axles. These axles are held together
by a device called a "truck". The truck mounts to the axles, contains the springs which cushion
Y____1~ __ I_
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the ride, and mates to the underside of the box car via a shallow bowl. Because the wheels on a
box car are rigidly coupled to the axle, there is no differential in speed of the wheels when
rounding a curve. Were rail wheels flat, there would be slippage of one or both wheels along the
track when navigating a curve. To avoid this condition, rail wheels are designed with a taper. The
diameter of a rail wheel increases from the outboard side of the wheel to the inboard side. Thus
when navigating a turn, the wheels on a train will shift towards the outside of the turn. This
changes the effective diameter of each wheel. The outside wheel in the turn is riding on its inboard
edge, where the diameter is larger, and the inside wheel is riding on its outboard edge, where the
diameter is smaller.
Figure 2-b Rail Wheels and Axle
otion of turn
Figure 2-c Differential action around a curve
From the figure above it is clear that a set of rail wheels can move in a direction perpendicular to
the direction of train travel. If this happens during a straight, flat section of rail it will cause the
axle to tip slightly to one side or the other. Because of the profile of the rail wheels, they will
naturally tend to want to "correct" this offset condition. This can lead to a repeated rocking back
and forth of the rail axles known as truck hunting. Truck hunting causes oscillations of the box
car which may be damaging to loads, and in severe cases can cause derailments.
The loads contained within a box car can also be damaged by forces exerted on the end of the car.
The process of coupling two box cars together is not a gentle one. One box car, the target,
remains stationary while a second one is rolled into it. This impact causes a coupling between the
two cars to engage. In many box cars the couplings have a hydraulic cushioning cylinder to
reduce the forces transmitted during this impact. In theory the maximum speed at which this
coupling can occur is 4 mph, but in practice this is difficult to monitor on a constant basis.
Both the cushioning unit and the coupler can be compressed and extended so that the total travel
between two attached cars may exceed 20 inches. This implies that when a long string of coupled
box cars is pulled by a locomotive, there is some "slack" in the train. Under acceleration this slack
is used up. As each coupling unit reaches its full extension there is a shock transmitted to the box
[
cars it connects. The same is true as the couplings are compressed (when a train is pushed, or is
going down a hill slowly for instance). The forces generated by this process are called slack action
and are thought to contribute significantly to damage to rail goods.
2.3 Rail network basics
Perhaps the simplest way to visualize the rail system is as a large number of nodes with paths
between those nodes. There are terminal nodes where a rail line ends (places like plants that ship
by rail, end-of-line stations for passenger rail, and rail service yards) and intermediate nodes
through which rail lines pass (like "switching yards" and the station stops along a passenger rail
route). Transport by rail involves navigating from the origin node to the destination node. Good
transport by rail means doing this in a time and cost effective manner.
A typical rail route may involve travel along many different paths through the system. Not all
parts traveling on a path are headed for the same destination, nor do they share the same origin. A
train traveling from Detroit to Chicago may contain parts from a supplier in New Jersey to a
customer in California, as well as from a supplier in Buffalo to a customer in Chicago. This
implies that a train arriving at an intermediate node will need to be disassembled so that the
individual cars can be sent to the next node on their path. A node where this takes place is known
as a switching or classification yard. Literally "switching" a car means moving it from one track to
another. Colloquially switching can refer to any rearranging of cars. Switching a plant involves
removing the box cars from that plant and replacing them with different ones.
When a series of box cars are assembled into a train in a switching yard, the order in which the
cars are connected is described as the blocking of the train. A well blocked train will have all of
the cars going to one destination kept together in the line of cars. A poorly blocked train may
have all of the cars going to one destination scattered throughout the train. How well a train is
blocked affects how long it takes to switch that train.
The average one way rail journey in Ford service is 514 miles and takes 4.2 days. A journey may
take a car directly from origin to destination, or may require several switches along the way.
Plants that ship a large volume of material by rail may be switched as often as five times per day.
Plants that ship very little by rail may only be switched once every other day. There are currently
7693 rail cars assigned to Ford service. Of these the vast majority (5974) are 86 foot long high
cube cars. These are primarily used to carry metal stampings, but also can carry plastic
components such as fascias and fuel tanks. Of the remaining cars, 1014 are 60 foot cars which
primarily carry powertrain components, and 705 are frame cars which carry frames for trucks and
non-unibody cars.
2.4 Literature survey
Upon concluding a literature search for information on railroad equipment and logistics design,
one might think that all US railroads went out of business in the early 1960s. Many of the books
and articles dealing with the railroads were written before 1900, and very few after 1975. In 1980
the US railroad industry was deregulated in the Staggers Act, but even this development received
relatively little treatment in the literature. The existing post-1960 literature breaks down into four
major categories: the rail business and service environment, design and modeling of rail logistics
systems, innovations in rail equipment, and the engineering and physics of rail transport.
In a Transportation Research Board Conference Address Martland, Little, and Sussman7 discuss
providing reliable service to different rail traffic classes. They argue that the definition of
"reliable" service depends upon certain characteristics of the commodity being transported. They
also analyze the major causes of variability or unreliability in rail transport. In a similar article
written 18 years prior to Martland, Stenger and Beier' describe ways for the railroads to more
effectively market their services. They advocate a customer needs driven marketing approach
7 Martland, Little, Sussman 1994
8 Steiger and Beier, 1976
where the railroads assume greater roles as "logistics providers". Gary Draper9 discusses rail (and
other modes of shipment) from an oil and chemical company's point of view. He offers
suggestions for how to take advantage of the changes (including deregulation) within both the rail
and trucking industries. In a Transportation Quarterly article, Delaney'o describes how better
service from transportation and logistics providers has enabled a reduction in total US inventories
and decreased order lead times. He also notes that the rail industry increased return on investment
in an era of decreasing unit revenues.
For reasons we will discuss later the optimization of rail logistics is a complex problem. Models
exist for optimizing simplified models of a rail network, or for optimizing service as measure by a
simplified set of metrics. Marin and Salmeron" describe exact and heuristic methods for designing
rail freight networks. The objective function is total cost, including the operating costs of moving
the freight, the logistics costs of reclassifying the freight at intermediate yards, and the investment
cost of required additional capacity. Harker and Hong outline a pricing scheme that would price
the resource of "use of existing rail track" using a market-like approach. Their argument is that
the total rail system in the US is operated sub-optimally because each railroad is trying to
maximize profit over its own sections of track without regards to the whole system. They
advocate applying game theory to determine the prices for track usage that would result in the
determination of more optimal train schedules.
Although equipment innovations are relatively rare in the railroad shipping industry, the literature
reflects the occasional innovation. Many "railroad" equipment innovations deal with transporting
containerized freight or over-the-road trailers by rail. What is most striking about the
"innovations" described in various conference proceedings is that the same features are listed as
innovations year after year. One gets the impression that new rail equipment designs are not
widely circulated in the industry. The proceedings from the ASME in 198012 regarding "Progress
in railway mechanical engineering" claim that there is "renewed concentration on design for
9 Draper, 1986
1o Delaney, 1991
" Marin and Salmon, 1996
12 ASME "Progress in Railway Mechaical Engineering"
commodities other than coal". The article continues on to cite innovations in intermodal service,
including the concept of a "road-railer", or an over the road trailer that can run on rail tracks.
Other innovations include a variety of improved hopper cars, tanker cars, and covered steel coil
cars. The proceedings from the 1994 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and
Exposition include a review of "Progress in railroad freight car engineering". 13" It is interesting to
note that nearly all of the progress came in the area of intermodal equipment, including a covered
steel coil car and an over the road trailer capable of riding on rail track. There were no advances
to box cars, or major box car components. In Europe, a similar conference in 1990 yielded
designs for improved intermodal service similar to those in the 1980 ASME and 1994 IMEC
proceedings. 14 Included in the European review were new methods of placing over the road
trailers directly on rail track.
Numerous articles deal with the physics of rail transportation. Treatments of the subject range
from highly sophisticated computer models of rail equipment dynamics to flaws with current
equipment specifications. Bhatti and Garg"5 provide a very readable discussion of rail dynamics, as
well as a good introduction to the associated terminology. Discussions of the design and
performance of specific rail car components can be found for components ranging from
bulkheads 16 to the springs and axles for special purpose rail cars.' 7 Scales 18presents a good
discussion of the dynamics within a train during impacts and travel.
In this chapter we have come to understand how the poor fit between rail as a mode of parts
shipment and Ford's new strategies became apparent. The move from rail to truck was slowed
only by the physical limitations of installing new truck docks in assembly plants. Fear of increasing
labor costs gave rise to consideration of new rail equipment designs. Rail delivery reliability and
13 Punwami. 1994
14 Etwell, 1990
" Bhatti and Garg, 1984
16 Leedham, Sfirakis, and Spearin, 1993
17 Singh, Irani, Punwani
18 Scales, 1984
transit duration became more pressing issues as lean manufacturing and tighter cost targets
became realities. Having armed ourselves with a basic understanding of rail logistics and
equipment we must now turn our attention to understanding the specific needs of Ford's new
strategies and the implications of these needs for rail.
3. Ford's Strategic Direction and the Future of Rail
In this chapter we will attempt to answer three questions: How are Ford's strategic initiatives
changing the demands on rail service, how do the railroads view their auto parts business, and
how is Ford's truck vs. rail decision making process equipped to deal with the changes in Ford's
needs and the railroads changing services?
3.1 Why is Ford changing the way things are done?
At a high level, Ford's strategic objectives address the basic issues of cost, quality, and timing.
Cost and quality are relatively unambiguous terms, but timing can mean different things at
different times. For the purposes of this study, we will look at issues of timing as they pertain to
material delivery and movement through the factory. Let us examine the three strategies which
most greatly impact the appeal of rail as a mode of shipping, and see how each strategy addresses
the issues of cost, quality and timing.
3.1.1 Ford Production System
In 1995 roll-out began of the Ford Production System. This system, known internally as FPS, was
designed to remove waste from Ford's manufacturing and distribution operations. The system was
inspired by Toyota's success in gaining market share, improving quality, and reducing costs
through the use of the Toyota Production System. The Ford Production System addresses issues
of effective work groups, defect elimination, capacity optimization, production throughput
optimization, and total cost. FPS metrics extend beyond the plant floor to measure performance
of the entire supply chain at achieving lean production. FPS metrics have implications for the fit of
rail as a mode of shipping in all three areas we are examining- cost, quality and timing.
Cost: Minimize total per unit cost. In the past, Ford has emphasized labor and overhead as plant
cost metrics. FPS aims to broaden the cost perspective to include all inputs to the delivered cost
of a vehicle. The total cost includes not only materials, labor, and overhead, but transportation,
facilities, inventory, salaried support, and any other contributing component. Rail offers both
advantages and disadvantages in terms of cost per unit. The cost per ton-mile of rail is typically
lower than by truck for longer distance moves, but the typical amount of in-transit inventory is
greater. We will discuss more about the rail cost structure in a later chapter. For the time being,
we should note that FPS increases the focus on transportation, inventory, and logistics costs.
Quality: Zero Defects/Zero Waste. FPS sets a stretch objective of zero defects, or a 100% first
time through capability. Clearly defect reduction is required if total costs are to be reduced, but
there is a more serious effect of defects in a lean system than merely the cost of bad parts. As
inventories are reduced, defects are more quickly passed on to subsequent operations. Any
defects passed on to an assembly plant can halt production and cause profit losses on the order of
millions of dollars per day of lost production.
Not only must supplier production processes produce zero defects, the shipping of parts must not
cause any damage. Rail shipping is widely perceived as a "rough" mode of shipment, which causes
significant material and shipping container damage. For the period from 9/94 to 7/96 Ford filed
over $3.5 million in damaged material claims against its major rail suppliers.' 9 This number likely
under-represents the actual value of material damaged by rail because of the difficulty of actually
filing a damage claim. If rail is to be a significant mode of transit in the future, part damage must
clearly be reduced in a total cost effective manner. This has implications for the design of shipping
containers, rail cars themselves, and for the logistics of moving material by rail.
Timing (1):Reduction of order to delivery time for components. Ford has made the decision that
there should be no more than six days between the time an assembly plant places an order for a
part and the time that part leaves the assembly plant on a finished vehicle




Part Installed on Vehicle
Total Transit Time
Less than Six Days
Figure 3-a- Order to Delivery window
TransitTime < 6 - SupplierMCT - FinishedGoods - AssemblyPlantStock - SubsequentAssembly
Equation 3-a Maximum transit time as allowed by FPS
If rail is to be a viable mode of transit, the transit time must be reduced as per Equation 3-a.
Figure 3-b shows the distribution of one way rail transit times for all routes in Ford's rail system.
Of the 275 origin-destination pairs in Ford's rail system, 46 have one way transit times of greater
than six days. Clearly all routes with one way transits greater than 6 days will not satisfy Equation
3-a. Many of the routes with transit times of 3-5 days may not satisfy this equation depending on
the manufacturing cycle times of the components being shipped, and the installation location
along the assembly line. In a presentation to Ford's major rail transportation suppliers, FPS
representatives set a "stretch objective" of 24 hour delivery between any two rail locations in
North America. This goal is based on current levels for supplier manufacturing cycle times,
finished goods inventories, and assembly plant stocks.20 The longest non-Mexican route in Ford's
North American rail system is from the Budd Company's Philadelphia plant to Ford's Kansas
City Assembly Plant. This route is 1126 miles and currently takes 6 days one way. To meet the
FPS stretch objective the train from Philadelphia to Kansas city would have to average more than
47 miles per hour. The fastest train in the Ford system today covers 580 miles in one day, roughly
20 DeMuro/Dietrich
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than half of the distance that the Philadelphia-Kansas City train would need to cover in the same
period of time.
Figure 3-b Distribution of One Way Standard Rail Transit Times
Timing (2): Reduction of delivery time window to +/- 15 minutes. FPS requires that all material
arrive within 15 minutes of the scheduled arrival time. Current rail on-time statistics vary
significantly by plant and by rail line, but in many locations rail does not perform at the level
required by FPS. For example, the Twin Cities assembly plant measures on time performance as
delivery no more than 24 hours past the scheduled delivery time, and has an average on time rail
performance of less than 85%. For all of Norfolk Southern's Ford routes the on time
performance (where on time is defined as less than 4 hours late) averages between 95% and 97%.
3.1.2 ILVS
The 6 day order to delivery window outlined in FPS assumes that there is a corresponding 6 day
fixed, level, and sequenced schedule. This concept is what Ford refers to as In Line Vehicle
Sequencing. The vision for ILVS is as follows: Dealers place orders for vehicles beginning four
weeks before the date the vehicle will be built. As the build date nears, the orders are fitted into a
production sequence which is leveled for mix options.2 1 Six days before the build date, the
production sequence is locked in, and parts orders are sent to suppliers. Suppliers then
manufacture and ship the required parts in the sequence they will be installed on vehicles.
ILVS has different implications for different levels of complexity. For example, parts with low
complexity and low storage costs are unlikely to be sequenced. A simple example of this is
fasteners. If there are two types of screws in a particular application and a small box holds thirty
days worth of screws, it would be unwise to provide the operator with a "sequenced stream" of
screws. Rather, two boxes of screws are placed at the line side, and the operator simply picks from
the appropriate box. Error-proofing techniques can be used to prevent installation of the wrong
screw. For parts with high complexity and high storage costs, such as instrument panels,
sequencing can yield a lower total cost. Ford has not yet established specific guidelines for
determining which parts will be sequenced. Nonetheless, rail presents a number of difficulties in
implementing ILVS for sequenced parts, all related to the issue of timing.
Timing (1) Excessive transit time: As discussed above, many rail transit times will exceed the
order to delivery window. The negative impacts of unreliable rail delivery are much worse in an
ILVS system. Under the current operating conditions, if a rail car is delayed in transit, the rail
carrier will often expedite a different rail car containing the same commodities to meet customer
demand. In an ILVS system where parts are identified to match up to specific vehicles, this type
of expediting will no longer suffice.
Timing (2) Sequence integrity: Managing a sequenced stream of incoming parts is somewhat
problematic in rail as opposed to truck due to conveyance layout. Because a trailer has one door
on the end of the trailer, parts are unloaded in the reverse sequence of which they were loaded.
This facilitates the unloading of sequenced parts in the assembly plants. For example, finished seat
21 Leveling involves distributing option features evenly throughout the production sequence. For example a
production sequence that called for 40 vehicles with sunroofs to be produced in a row might strain the resources of
the sunroof installation portion of the assembly line. A level production mix would spread vehicles with sunroofs
throughout the production mix.
kits are shipped in sequence to assembly plants on specially equipped trucks. The seats are loaded
into the trucks in reverse sequence order, and roll off in sequence at the assembly plant.
The unloading of rail cars in sequence requires additional decision making because the doors to
the rail cars are located in the center of the cars. When an operator opens a rail car door he will
typically be facing 4-12 racks which he can unload in stacks of 1, 2, or 3 high. He must decide
which stack to unload first, whether to destack the load before or after unloading it, and which
side of the car to unload once the racks in the doorway are removed. Rail cars are bi-directional,
and may get turned around several times during their transit. This implies that the side of the rail
car facing the loading dock may be different at the assembly plant than at the supplier plant, and
that there is no "front" of the car. Thus unloading a rail car in the reverse sequence from which it
was loaded is a more complicated problem than unloading a sequenced truck. Current rail
operating conditions would require a staging area where the racks from a rail car could be sorted
into their appropriate sequence.
3.1.3 Greening
One of the key elements of the seven major strategies underlying Ford 2000 is to "Lead in
Corporate Citizenship". Among other things, this strategy requires attention to the environmental
impacts of Ford's decisions. Since over 50% of the waste from Ford manufacturing plants is non-
returnable packaging materials22, reducing the packaging waste stream is a major part of leading
in corporate citizenship. Reducing the packaging waste stream will also help meet increasing
legislative demands governing manufacturing waste generation and disposal. The most obvious
way to reduce the packaging waste stream is to eliminate disposable packaging. Unless Ford
learns to design parts that don't need protective packaging, this will mean using more returnable
shipping containers and packaging materials.
Cost: Increased requirement for return transportation of empty shipping containers. The current
pricing structure of rail is based on round trip transportation, whereas the truck pricing structure
is based on one way pricing. This means that if a commodity is currently shipped by truck in
22Packaging Waste Stream Elimination Strategy Report, May 1996
disposable packaging, and greening requires a shift to a returnable container, the transportation
cost for the commodity doubles.23 This gives rail a greater cost advantage for returnable
containers than for disposable ones.
Although the pricing structure of rail is favorable in terms of transportation cost for returnable
containers, the rack investment costs required to ship by rail are higher. Not only is rail typically a
slower way to ship goods than truck, the return transits for empty racks shipped by rail are longer
than the loaded transit time. For the 30 day period ending October 3, 1996 the average return
transit time to a Ford stamping plant was 2.34 times as long as the transit from the stamping plant
to the assembly plant. This implies that more racks must be purchased to fill a rail pipeline than a
truck pipeline. Looking at the October 1996 data and weighting the outbound vs. inbound transit
difference for volumes along each route, we find that the excess outbound transportation time
causes a 40% increase in the required number of racks to stock the transit pipeline.24 (This figure
of 40% weights delays by the number of box cars affected. For example a delay of ten box cars
for one day is ten times as bad as a delay of one box car for one day.)
In addition to the cost of purchasing additional racks to fill the rail pipeline, Ford incurs the cost
of tracking these racks through the entire transportation system and of redistributing common or
shared racks as needed among supplier plants. Ford is currently examining strategies for container
control, including the possibility of a supplier managed container system. Although it is not clear
who will pay to implement and manage a container control system, these costs will eventually
flow back to Ford in one way or another.
Quality: Required level of part protection. As discussed earlier, rail transit has the potential to
transmit significant forces to the loads being transported. Rail shipping racks are designed to
withstand these greater forces. This means building heavier, sturdier racks. Not only do heavier
and sturdier racks cost more in material required to fabricate, but the fuel consumed by
23 This assumes a 1:1 loaded to empty container ratio. Some returnable containers can be collapsed when empty, so
the increase in transportation cost is less than simply doubling the one way transit.
24 Assumes that rack investment to fill the pipeline is proportional to the number of box cars required to fill the
pipeline.
transporting the rack along its route for many years represents a life cycle cost. Because FPS
requires parts not be damaged in transit, rack designs are likely to become even more costly to
provide the required protection.
Not only are the racks themselves likely to become more expensive, but there is a risk of a
decreased packaging density. To prevent material damage, greater inter-part spacing may be
required in packaging. If the packaging density is reduced, more racks or larger racks will be
required to ship the required volumes. Although there are no current indications of a trend
towards decreased packaging density at Ford, there are such indications at one of Ford's
competitors. Increased product quality requirements have decreased packaging density, and some
moves have been shifted from truck to rail because of this.25 There is a risk that as FPS demands
zero transit related damage Ford may opt to decrease packaging density to reduce the risk of part
to part contact.
Timing: Incentives to reduce return transit pipeline. As more material is shipped in returnable
containers, the amount of capital tied up in racks increases. If the return transit time continues to
significantly exceed the loaded transit time, rail companies will see increasing pressure to bring the
two transit times into line. As described above, reducing return transit times to the same level as
loaded transits could translate into a reduction of as much as 40% in rack investment.
Ford's guidelines for the design of returnable containers aim to reduce the amount of material
shipped in a returnable container to one day's worth or less. This has similar implications as
reducing the packaging density. Because the cost often containers, each measuring one cubic
foot, is likely to be greater than the cost of one container, measuring ten cubic feet, this guideline
will increase container investment in some cases. This increase in container cost will drive a
reduction in the return transit time.
25 6/14/96 Competitor interview
Finally, as more returnable containers are put into use the delivery accuracy and reliability of
container return will become more important. If the container system becomes truly lean, the
impact of a late delivery of containers or a mislabeled shipment of containers becomes more
serious. Current practices are not highly reliable when it comes to accurately identifying box car
contents, particularly for shipments of empty containers.
3.2 "What we think about auto parts cars"- The railroad perspective on fit
The issue of "fit" needs to be examined not only from the point of view of Ford as a customer of
rail shipping, but from the point of view of the railroads as well. First we need to understand the
percentage of total revenue railroads derive from automotive related transportation. Then we
need to compare the demands of handling auto parts with other commodities shipped by rail.
Finally we need to understand how the railroads view the competitive market in which they
operate.
Railway Operating Revenues by Market Group
for Norfolk Southern
1995 1994 1993
Coal $1,240.3 $1,262.5 $1,213.3
Paper/Forest $519.8 $505.4 $502.7
Chemicals $513.5 $512.2 $472.9
Automotive $454.1 $432.1 $429.5
Agriculture $359.0 $347.5 $319.7
Metals/Construction $339.5 $321.4 $296.1
Intermodal $470.5 $425.6 $390.2
Total $3,896.7 $3,806.7 $3,624.4
From 1995 Financial statements
Figure 3-c Railway Revenue Distribution
Figure 3-c shows the distribution of revenues for the Norfolk Southern railroad. Note that
revenues from automotive business are only 11.6% of total rail revenues.26 The heading
"Automotive" includes not only parts shipments from suppliers to assembly plants, but finished
26 For the rail industry as a whole auto related transportation represents 5.87% of total revenue (Logistics
Management, January 1997)
vehicles as well. NS ships finished vehicles for 16 vehicle manufacturers, but parts for only the
Big Three.27 This implies that the total percentage of revenue derived from auto parts shipment is
very small, and the incentives for NS to devote significant management attention to auto parts are
small.
Figure 3-c also shows that the largest source of railway revenue is coal shipping, and the fastest
growing segment is intermodal. Shipping coal demands a very different set of management
priorities than shipping auto parts. Coal is most often shipped in dedicated trains (100 or more
identical cars filled with coal). Because of the low value per ton of coal, inventory costs are much
less for a coal train than for a similarly sized load of auto parts. Coal can not be damaged
significantly by a harsh ride, and requires no protection from the elements. Coal deliveries are not
typically made on a just in time basis, so delivery reliability is not as crucial as for auto parts. The
manager of a railroad control center, which tracks rail cars and their contents during shipment,
commented, "We pay more attention to Ford's parts cars that to anything else"2 8. When compared
to coal, auto parts seem to be a more difficult way to earn a smaller percentage of total revenue.
Despite the seeming un-appeal of devoting resources to auto parts business, NS continues to
make notable efforts to retain this business. As Ford and other manufacturers move towards a
smaller supply base, NS and other railroads may risk losing the profitable finished vehicle business
if they do not provide quality auto parts service as well. In attempts to assist Ford in better
managing material distribution, NS encourages Ford to make use of the growing intermodal
transportation options available.
27 NS ships finished vehicles for BMW, Chrysler, Ford, GM, Honda, Isuzu, Jaguar, Land Rover, Mazda,
Mitsubishi, Nissan, Saab, Subaru, Suzuki, Toyota, and Volkswagen.
28 6/18/96 Virginia Control Center
3.3 The truck vs. rail decision making process
3.3.1 Conventional Wisdom
The existing rail paradigm within Ford claims that rail is effective for parts shipped in returnable
containers, in large volumes over long distances, while shorter routes and smaller volumes are
appropriate for trucks. This paradigm is based on four interrelated characteristics of rail
shipment: the "set up to run time" ratio, the volumetric shipping quantities, the cost per mile, and
the pricing structure.
To borrow production terminology, rail transit has a very high "set up to run time" ratio relative
to truck transit. In this analogy, switching cars, blocking trains, and waiting for connections are
the "set-ups", and actually moving along the rail lines is the "run time". Not only are the set up
times high in relation to the run times, but they do not scale (i.e. they have a large fixed
component). The time between switches and the time a load spends waiting for a connection are
independent of the length of the total trip. In cases where the distance to be traveled is "small", a
truck can often complete the trip from supplier to customer before a rail car would have been
switched out of the plant and made its mainline connection. In the current rail paradigm, "small"
seems to be less that 250-300 miles. Of the 275 routes in Ford's system, only 31 are less than 250
miles long, and 14 are between 250 and 300 miles long. 29 Both FPS and ILVS demand shorter
transit times with more reliable delivery windows. The current rail paradigm indicates that on both
these counts over-the-road trailers seem better suited to Ford's new manufacturing strategy.
Although the "set up to run time" is high, rail has the advantage of a lower cost per ton-mile in
nearly all routes than truck. 30 Because of the nature of rail shipping, the variable costs such as
labor and fuel can be spread out over a larger base than in over the road trailers. A typical train
might consist of a locomotive pulling 100 or more cars, with a three or four member crew that
can run 24 hours a day. To move the equivalent amount of material in trucks would take at least
29 INTRAN standard route length for all routes in 1997 Car Report
30 With the exception of very short routes, the transportation cost of shipping a given load by rail will almost
always be less than of shipping the same load by truck.
300 trailers, each with a two man crew for 24 hour operation. As affordable business targets drive
costs in all areas down, rail becomes a more attractive mode of shipping.
The cubic capacity of an 86 foot long standard box car is 10,110 ft3. The cubic capacity of a 53
foot long over the road trailer is 3147 ft3 . Because of differences in the shapes of shipping racks,
it often takes 4-6 over the road trailers to convey the same material as one rail car. This implies
that rail is better suited to high volumetric shipping quantities. Larger parts required in high
volumes are typical candidates for rail shipment. Stampings are a good example of parts that are
shipped by rail even over relatively short distances due to their high cubic volume. Because FPS
requires smaller batch sizes, this aspect of rail shipment will encourage some parts to be shipped
by truck instead of rail.
Finally, the historical pricing structures for rail and truck differ in one key way- rail is priced
round trip, whereas truck is priced one way. For goods shipped in returnable containers, the cost
per round trip mile advantage of rail is even greater. As Ford ships more material in returnable
containers, this aspect of the rail pricing structure will make rail a more attractive mode of
shipping.
3.3.2 Description from ISO 9000 Documentation
According to Ford's logistics analysts the primary determinant of the transportation mode for a
given commodity is history. The mode of shipment will typically not change from rail to truck or
vice versa unless a new supplier is sourced. Requests for mode changes will be entertained when a
plant involved presents a compelling reason for the change. For example, manufacturing engineers
requested that headliners be shipped by truck rather than rail due to a history of transit related
damage and the mode for this move was changed. This implies that the modes of shipping
currently in use may not be optimally suited for Ford's new manufacturing strategy. As Ford
changes the way it manages the supply chain, the truck vs. Rail decision making process must
change accordingly. We will look at how the mode decision is currently made within Ford, and
compare that with the new supply chain strategies. We will also examine how a competitor makes
mode decisions, and what we can learn from this.
Interviews with Ford logistics planners indicated that there is not one single format used by all
analysts to make the truck versus rail decision, but that the IS09000 documentation outlines the
general approach taken by all analysts. The ISO documentation includes outlines of the decision
making processes for the establishment of a new move, the calculation of the required number of
rail cars to service a given origin, and the calculation of logistics costs before and after a change
to packaging, mode, daily volumes, etc.
Figure 3-d and Figure 3-e below depict the truck vs. rail decision making process for two separate
cases. The first depicts what a logistics analyst is supposed to do when some feature of a move
has changed. This might include increased volume along the route, a change in supplier, or a
change in packaging. The second deals with the truck vs. rail decision for a new move of
powertrain components. These processes illustrate the decision making guide found in the
IS09000 documentation; the ISO documents themselves do not contain process flows.
Assembly Plant Methods and Routing
















Powertrain Routing- Establishing transportation info for a new move
Figure 3-e Powertrain Routing Study Instructions
The salient feature of these decision making processes is the lack of detail surrounding the actual
truck vs. rail decision itself. There is no mention in these processes of analyzing the cost
associated with protecting against rail shipping variability, damage to goods, required additional
rack investment, or even an inventory vs. transportation cost analysis. A group has been
established within Ford and is working to outline a more formal decision making process, but
these guidelines were not defined during the time of this research. If Ford is to align
transportation decisions with corporate strategies the analysts making those decisions will need to
be equipped with the proper tools to identify and compare the relevant cost, quality and timing
issues of the truck vs. rail decision.
Figure 3-f below identifies the components of the cost of transporting material from one plant to
another. When making mode decision (truck vs. rail) each of these costs should be identified,
insofar as possible, and compared for the two modes.
Components of Cost: Description:
Transportation Cost Cost charged by truck or rail shipping company per move
including rack return if applicable
Inventory (pipeline, safety, In-transit inventory, plus supplier and customer inventory
warehouse) held to protect against transit variation, plus warehoused
inventory
Damage Damage caused by poor ride quality in transit
Demurrage Cost charged by truck and rail companies for detaining
trailers or box cars over an allotted number of days
Lost production Cost of production idled due to late arrival of truck or rail
car
Premium freight Cost of deviations in mode due to constraints of transit
Container investment Cost of rack (related to ride harshness in truck vs. rail)
Total number of racks to be purchased (related to pipeline
length)
Material handling labor In-plant labor required to load and unload conveyance
In-plant storage space Square feet required to store/stage incoming and outgoing
material due to conveyance constraints
Material handling equipment Purchase or lease cost of fork trucks, tugs, AGVs, etc.
required to load and unload conveyance
Material management Number and cost of hours spent managing incoming and
outgoing material in truck vs. rail
Figure 3-f Total Cost Components of material movement
Some of these items can easily be quantified, while others are more elusive. Transit cost can easily
be identified and quantified for various modes. Inventory cost breaks down into pipeline
inventory, which is a function of transit time and variability, safety stock which is held to protect
against transit variability, and any inventory being warehoused for other reasons. Simple safety
stock calculations available in commercially available packages can determine the in transit
inventory and safety stock needed to provide a certain service level given a distribution of transit
times. Warehoused inventory costs may relate to "sequencing centers" which assist in the delivery
of an ILVS stream of parts into assembly plants, or other types of warehouses based on
situational needs.
Damage costs, while very real, are very hard to capture. Data on transit related damage is highly
aggregated, and likely underestimates the actual amount of transit related damage. When an
assembly plant opens up a box car and finds damaged parts, they must first decide if the damage
was caused by poor ride quality or poor supplier material handling. If there is reason to believe
the ride quality is at fault, the assembly plant must go through a formal, paperwork intensive
process to file a damage claim which the railroad can dispute. If, however, the supplier is thought
to be at fault, the supplier is simply charged for defective quality and replacement parts are sent at
the supplier's expense. This process seems likely to underestimate the actual level of transit
caused damage simply due to the effort required to report it. Nonetheless, damage costs should be
factored into the total cost when they are known or can be reasonably estimated.
Demurrage costs accumulate when a trailer or box car is held at a plant for an excessively long
period of time due to the plant's actions. In most cases demurrage results when conveyances are
used as warehouses. A supplier may over-ship to a customer to alleviate congestion in a supplier
plant. The customer plant does not have the floor space to store the excess material, and simply
leaves the material in the conveyance until such time as it is required. This can leave trailers and
box cars idle for days on end. Truck and rail companies charge for the opportunity cost of this
idle equipment, and data on demurrage charges is relatively easy to obtain.
The cost of lost production can be measured as the opportunity cost of idling a plant (supplier or
customer) due to the late arrival of a conveyance. As the amount of safety stock is increased the
likelihood of lost production decreases. When making transportation planning decisions, the
balance between safety stock and lost production must be weighed for both truck and rail.
Probabilistic models can determine the expected value of lost production for a given level of
safety stock and transit time distributions. The challenge in accurately quantifying this cost
component lies in collecting sufficient correct data to accurately characterize transit times.
Deviations to premium freight occur when the normal mode of transit will not get a shipment to a
customer by some required time. Deviations can take many forms including faster trains, specially
ordered trucks, helicopters, planes, and the occasional employee-with-a-pick-up-truck. Because
trains depart from supplier facilities at predetermined "cut off' times, and must meet other trains
on a fixed schedule it is unlikely that a railroad will delay a train to wait for one late shipment. In
many cases a supplier will only ship once per day in rail. If that supplier is an hour late in getting
his goods to the train, he may have to wait for 23 hours until he can ship again. In cases when 23
hours is too long, he must deviate into a different mode of shipment. Unlike rail, a truck can be
held for an hour without large systemic consequences. This implies that it is easier to deviate out
of rail than out of truck. Because premium freight has significant costs associated with it, the
expected value of premium freight should be factored into the cost of a given mode of shipment.
The required level of container (rack and packaging) investment will be different for truck vs. rail
for two main reasons. Because rail has a longer and more variable transit time, more racks must
be purchased to fill the entire shipping pipeline. This cost is relatively easy to quantify given the
racks costs and transit times. What may be harder to quantify is the impact of ride quality on
container cost. As discussed above, rail places significantly greater stresses on racks than does
truck shipment. Either certain rail racks must be designed to withstand this extra stress, or all
racks must be designed to withstand these loads. In either case, the additional durability required
of rail racks is not free.
Because rail and truck typically have different shipment sizes, different amounts of in plant
storage space may be required. If a plant wants to stage a full conveyance load of material on the
dock, a much larger area will be required if the material is being shipped in a box car than if the
material is being shipped in a truck. Insofar as square footage is valued differently and is not
equally available in all plants, the cost of floor space associated with transportation mode should
be assessed.
Finally, the level of required material handling labor, equipment and management may be different
for goods shipped by rail than those shipped by truck. These costs can include not only the cost of
the hourly personnel who load and unload the conveyances, but the costs of time spent tracking
shipments, planning for unexpected variability in shipments, dealing with improperly labeled
shipments, preparing conveyances to be loaded or unloaded, leasing or buying equipment to move
material and the like. In individual cases the level of these cost for rail and truck will vary. In one
plant where the rail docks are very far from the material point of use, additional tugs and tug
drivers maybe required to move the material, whereas in a different plant it may be the truck dock
that is poorly situated. The impacts of these costs, though very large from the point of view of
plant personnel with specific budgets to meet, may be small relative to the total costs of shipping.
In any case these costs need to be evaluated and compared for the specific modes of
transportation being considered.
Evaluating the above listed costs for every move of every part destined for a Ford assembly plant
could quickly consume the resources of an unjustifiably large number of analysts. What would be
more sensible would be to evaluate these costs for a small sample of parts and moves to determine
the relative weights of the various cost components. With an understanding of these costs Ford
can establish which ones will figure into every analysis and which ones will only be calculated in
certain circumstances. This effort need not begin at ground zero. In evaluating the cost savings of
outsourcing the logistics function at the Oakville assembly plant, Ford hired Bain & Co.
consultants to estimate many of the above parameters. Simply determining the costs associated
with a small number of moves may shed some light on the relative weights of the cost
components, but a more complete understanding must include a characterization of how the
specifics of a move (i.e. large racks vs. small, heavy components vs. light, high value per cubic
foot vs. high value per pound, etc.) affect the contributions of each cost component.
3.3.3 A Competitor's Decision Making Process
It is interesting to examine the truck vs. rail decision making process of a competitor for the
purposes of comparison. Because this competitor has significantly less geographic dispersion in
both suppliers and assembly plants, there is much less rail shipping relative to Ford. Half of this
competitor's assembly plants do not even have rail sidings. In terms of the number of moves by
rail, the competitor's system is much smaller and easier to manage. The competitor does,
however, make greater use of cross docking31 and near-site warehouses, which complicates the
decision making process.
When making a truck vs. rail decision, The competitor's rail expert says he begins with a
historical knowledge of what parts might be candidates for rail based on volumes, weights, etc.
(This is very similar to what Ford's analysts said.) He then asks the following questions:
* Do the supplier and assembly plant have rail dock facilities?
* 8 of the competitor's 16 assembly plants are not rail equipped.
* Many facilities are served by rail warehouses- material goes in box cars to warehouses
which unload, sequence, and repackage material into trucks. (These "Flow through"
warehouses are operated by outside companies)
* Do the daily volumes and geography justify it?
* What are your daily volumes (measured in rail car loads vs. truck loads)
* What is the geography of the move (measured in miles)
* Weight concerns and box car length concerns (will you exceed the weight capacity of
a truck before you fill it?)
* Given part volumes, geography, and packaging, what are your inventory costs?
31 Cross docking refers to the transfer of material from truck to rail.
* Does the packaging accommodate it?
* Can racks go in rail? (Are they sturdy enough and the correct dimensions?)
* Note: The competitor, who does very little rail shipping, has designed racks to be
108 x 50 to fit in trucks (102 wide, 2 across) or rail (110 wide, 1 across). They are
trying to standardize these rack dimensions.
Once the above questions are answered a single page unit cost comparison is prepared.
Sample Competitor Transportation Study Matrix
Engine Transportation from Engine Plant to Detroit Assembly Plant
Alternative 1: Box car from engine plant to Detroit warehouse. Ship to assembly plant as needed
Alternative 2: Box car from engine plant to Detroit cross docking facility, immediate transfer to tucks for delivery
Altemative 3: Direct truck from engine plant to Detroit warehouse, truck to assembly plant as needed
Alternative 4: Direct truck from engine plant to assembly plant- store at assembly plant until needed
Altemative 5: Air freight from engine plant to assembly plant- store at assembly plant until needed
Alternative 6: Build rail dock at assembly plant for direct receipt of engines by rail (requires $500,000 investment)
Warehous
Total Round Trip Annual Transit Inventory Warehouse e-Assy
Loads per Transportation Transportation time Carrying Total Transit cost per 6 Plant Cost per
Altemative year Cost Cost (days) cost- 14% cost mos. trucking Total Cost unit
1. RailNVhse 50 $ 6,500 $ 325,000 15 $73,500 $ 398,500 $ 100,000 $35,000 $533,500 $ 26.68
2. Rail/x-dock 50 $ 6,500 $ 325,000 15 $73,500 $ 398,500 $ 35,000 $35,000 $468,500 $ 23.43
3. TruckNVhse 175 $ 4,000 $ 700,000 3 $14,700 $ 714,700 $ 100,000 $35,000 $849,700 $ 42.49
4. Truck Direct 175 $ 4,000 $ 700,000 3 $14,700 $ 714,700 $ - $ - $714,700 S 35.74
5. Air N/A $250/engine $ 5,000,000 2 $ 9,800 $5,009,800 $ - $ - $5,009,800 $250.49
Assumptions:
Annual volume: 20,000 engines /year
Daily demand: 70 engines/day
Cost of engine: $500 per engine
Warehouse cost includes: rental of climate controlled warehouse with inventory control, handling charges,and paperwork charges
Figure 3-g A Competitor's Transit Mode Decision Matrix
At the beginning of this chapter we posed three questions: How are Ford's strategic initiatives
changing the demands on rail service, how do the railroads view their auto parts business, and
how is Ford's truck vs. rail decision making process equipped to deal with the changes in Ford's
needs and the railroads changing services? The answer to the first question is that there are a
variety of impacts of Ford's new strategies. Generally speaking Ford's new way of doing business
will require greater discipline from the railroads just as it requires greater discipline from Ford
plants and departments. The railroads seem to want to meet Ford's needs, but there are
infrastructural and potentially cultural barriers to changing service to the extent required. It seems
that Ford's decision making process has not yet evolved to account for the new requirements, but
that relatively simple analyses (like those performed at a competitor ) can shed much light on the
trade-offs being considered.
4. Customer Needs Analysis
The conventional wisdom surrounding rail transport clearly suggested that the fit between rail and
Ford's new vision for manufacturing was poor. What the conventional wisdom does not tell us is
how we should improve that fit. To determine what changes to equipment design and logistics
management would increase the appeal of rail, we need to step down the ladder of abstraction to
uncover the needs underlying the conventional wisdom. For this we choose to borrow an
approach from product development- the structured customer needs analysis. The hope is that by
eliciting and documenting the specific, unfulfilled needs which give rise to the common perception
of rail as an unattractive mode of shipping we can create design specifications to guide alterations
to rail equipment and logistics. In this chapter we will examine the process used for eliciting and
understanding these needs.
The first step in a customer needs analysis is to identify the customers. For the purposes of this
analysis, the "customers" of rail were broadly defined to include all Ford functions with concern
or responsibility for some aspect of rail shipping, as well as rail shippers and rail equipment
manufacturers. In a typical product development customer needs analysis, there is usually little
doubt as to who the customers are, and there is not often a conflict between the needs of different
customer groups if the product mission is properly defined. Where conflict does arise in
traditional product development customer groups, it is possible to choose to focus on the needs of
one group over another without significant adverse effects. This is usually referred to as
narrowing the target market, or finding a market niche. As we will see, when applying a customer
needs analysis within a large corporation we encounter conflicting customer needs that must be
resolved. Thus the definition of our customers is an important and difficult step.
The customers whose needs will be considered in this analysis are the following:
* Assembly plants - Ford North American assembly plants
* Supplier plants - Both Ford plants and supplier plants, with an emphasis on Ford plants
* Material Handling and Packaging Engineering - The Ford organization responsible for
rack design, in-plant material movement systems, and material handling equipment.
* Material Planning and Logistics - The Ford organization responsible for the design and
management, of inter-plant material transportation. Also responsible for material tracking and
planning information systems.
* Transportation Procurement and Customs - The Ford organization responsible for
negotiating and procuring service from transportation providers. Only the rail procurement
group was involved in this analysis.
* Ford Production System - The Ford organization responsible for guiding the implementation
of the Ford Production System principles in Ford plants and throughout the Ford supply
chain.
* Rail Shipping Companies - In this analysis, Norfolk Southern provided the rail company
voice. NS is Ford's largest rail shipper.
* Rail Equipment Manufacturers - In this analysis the TTX company provided the voice of a
rail equipment supplier.
Each customer was interviewed in the environment in which he interacted with rail. In some cases
this meant interviewing customers while riding a locomotive, and in other cases it implied an
interview in an office with a computer and a phone. For the most part all customers were asked
similar questions regarding their interactions with rail. For example, issues of rail reliability were
discussed with all rail users. In some cases certain aspects of rail were transparent to one or more
users. (e.g. The Material Planning and Logistics organization was not significantly aware of or
concerned with the ease of operating box car doors.)
Once all interviews were completed, customer statements were translated into system features.
For example if a customer said, "I really wish the doors were not so hard to open. It's a real
problem when a door sticks and I can't get at the racks inside" we might translate that statement
to read, "Access to the interior of the car must be easy and reliable" Once all customer statements
were translated, the list of system features was condensed from over 200 features to 52 features
which represented the essence of what the customers had described.
The condensed system features list formed the basis for a survey. This survey asked the customers
who had described their needs to assign an importance to each of the system features. The intent
of this survey was to generate a prioritized list of desired system features which would be used to
guide the design and alteration of rail logistics and equipment. An unexpected result of this survey
was to illustrate the disparity between strategic corporate initiatives and the self described wants
of both the plant and staff personnel.
4.1 The voice of the plant customers
Interviews with plant personnel were conducted in seven production plants and one parts
distribution center. The seven plants were chosen to represent a cross section of Ford's
manufacturing plants as well as a variety of technological capabilities. Table 4-1 below shows the
seven plants, the functions interviewed at each, and the level of success the plant has had in
implementing technologically advanced material handling.




Milan Plastics Material control High
Utica Plastics Material control, fork lift driver Low
Buffalo Stamping Material handling engineering, shipping, High
fork lift drivers, material control,
Woodhaven Staff material handling Medium
Stamping
Twin Cities Material handling engineering, material High
Assembly control, receiving, computer integrated
manufacturing
Windsor Engine Shipping, staff material handling Medium
Lorain Assembly Material control, material handling Low
Sengineering, receiving, fork lift driver
Table 4-1 Plant Customers
There were several complaints that were common to all plant customers. The most prevalent
complaint was of door malfunction. Opening the doors on a box car requires a person to reach
over the gap between the rail car and the dock to twist a locking mechanism which allows the
door to open. The person must then slide the door sideways to gain access to the interior of the
car. If any of the rails on which the door rides are bent, improperly adjusted, or insufficiently
lubricated the effort required to open the door can exceed the capabilities of even a very strong
person. When this occurs, the person attempting to open the door will often use the forks of a
powered fork lift truck to force the door open. This action often involves impacting the door at an
angle to its direction of intended travel. This impact can further damage the door hardware,
making it even harder to open.
Doors can be damaged not only by improper opening, but by impact from within the car. When a
rail car is being loaded or unloaded, it is often the case that only the doors on one side of a car are
opened. When this is the case a fork lift driver loading or unloading racks from the car is likely to
hit the closed doors from the inside of the car. According to railroad personnel, both doors are
supposed to be opened during any loading or unloading to prevent this type of damage. One can
observe the indentations made by lift truck forks on both the inside and the outside of the box car
doors.
Although door maintenance is the largest complaint from plant personnel, other maintenance
issues were cited including holes in the roof and floors, bent rails along the interior walls of the
rail car, broken or splintered floors, and nonfunctioning cushioning devices. Occurrences of
broken doors or other maintenance items are so prevalent that most plants have personnel from
the railroads on site to deal with such problems as they arise. One plant claimed to call on these
maintenance personnel at least once per shift to fix a broken door.
Other common plant complaints about rail included the condition in which racks were returned
from assembly plants, the inaccuracy of information regarding box car contents, and the
unreliability of rail delivery. There were instances in which certain characteristics of rail were of
great concern to one plant, but seemed not to be an issue at another. For example, personnel at
the Lorain assembly plant did not view the delivery reliability of rail as a problem, whereas this
was cited as a primary concern at the Twin Cities assembly plant.
Among the attractive aspects of rail cited by many plant personnel were the large shipment size
relative to truck, and the physical location of rail docks within the plant in some cases. From a
receiving perspective, spotting a rail car into a plant requires much less effort than bringing in the
three to five trucks that would be required to carry an equivalent amount of material. Most plant
personnel actively did not want to see a move to smaller loads in rail cars. Some plants have
optimized portions of their plant layout for material flow to and from rail cars.
4.2 The voice of the staff customer
Of the customers listed above, several fall into a category termed "staff' customers. This group of
customers interacts indirectly with rail as a shipping mode as described above. One would expect
these customers to have very different needs than the plant customers who come into physical
contact with rail cars every day. Given the various ways in which these customers interact with
rail, we would expect a low degree of commonality in the customer needs statements. Despite
these diverse perspectives, a few common themes emerged.
Most staff customers were concerned in one way or another with the transit time rail provides.
Material Handling viewed this as a concern due to the increased rack purchase requirements;
Material Planning and Logistics expressed concern over the inventory costs associated with a long
pipeline; the Ford Production System representative believed that many rail transits would exceed
the allowable transit time; Transportation Procurement worried that the longer transit time would
increase the number of rail cars required, which would in turn increase the price of rail service.
Most staff customers also expressed concern over delivery reliability. To FPS, this issue is critical
since unreliable delivery will shut down plants in a lean supply chain. To some of the other
organizations, delivery reliability was only an issue insofar as it generated complaints from the
plants, which filtered up through the various organizations.
One surprising result was the lack of concern over rail's perceived inability to provide cost
effective shipment for small batches on a frequent basis. Only FPS expressed any concern over
this issue at all. We will examine this in more detail when we examine customer survey responses.
Some staff customers seemed most frustrated with the relationship with the railroads, rather than
with any one specific aspect of rail shipment. Words like "old school", "inflexible" and
"unresponsive" often surfaced in discussions of the railroads. The first slide of a presentation
given by Material Handling to the railroad companies on the role of rail in Ford's future contained
the following:
"Webster's Definition of Railroad: To push through hastily or without due consideration.
Webster considers this the definition of a verb, we consider it the definition of a noun."
4.3 The voice of the Non-Ford Customers
Because rail shipping involves not only Ford manufacturing facilities, but railroad companies and
rail equipment manufacturers as well, representatives from these groups were interviewed as
"customers". The top concern of Norfolk Southern seemed to be equipment utilization. Because
the railroads have a large depreciation expense, idle equipment represents a significant cost.
Along with the opportunity cost of idle box cars, railroad executives cited the logistics costs of
rerouting cars in non-standard paths as a concern. These non-standard moves typically arose when
parts that were normally shipped by rail were deviated to truck, and Ford wanted the rail
companies to ship the empty racks back via rail.
Norfolk Southern also expressed concern over variability within the rail system. They cited
adherence to cut off times (i.e. how often plants are ready to release a rail car at the scheduled
release time) as a cause of schedule variability. Better blocking was cited as a way that Ford
policies could contribute to the efficiency or inefficiency of rail switching, and as an area in which
the railroads would like to see improvement.
The nature of the rail logistics system seems to put the railroads in a rather difficult position. On
one hand, the rail system only provides reliable delivery when all participants in the system meet
the predetermined schedules. For example, delaying a train for a few minutes to allow a
customer's shipment to not have to wait for the next day's train has adverse impacts on the timely
delivery of other customer's shipments. On the other hand, the rail companies would like to be as
flexible as possible to their customers' needs. This may mean allowing customers to be a few
minutes late in getting all of their goods ready to ship. The interdependencies of the rail system
make it not well suited to be highly flexible to customer needs while providing reliable, low cost
service.
Rail companies have dealt with the conflict between customer focus and system efficiencies in two
notable ways. Most major rail companies offer not only pure rail service, but intermodal service in
a variety of forms. Many rail companies are also trying to be full service logistics suppliers. Both
of these moves help decouple the customers from the sensitive scheduling of rail. As a full service
logistics supplier, a rail company has control over deviation mode decisions. If the cost to the rail
company of sending a shipment via truck is less than the cost of delaying a train to wait for that
shipment, the rail company is free to make that choice. If a supplier's goods were not ready for
shipment in time for the scheduled train departure, the rail logistics supplier could truck the goods
to a downstream rail stop, thus leapfrogging the train, and load the parts on the train for the rest
of their journey.
4.4 Needs prioritization
Once interviews with all relevant customers were completed, customer statements were translated
into system features. These features were condensed into a list of 53 summary features, which the
customers who had been interviewed were asked to rank. Customers classified each feature as
being either Critical, Desirable, Neural, Undesirable, or Unacceptable. Table 4-2 below shows the
systems features included in the survey. The order in which the features are listed reflects the
survey results. The number next to each feature reflects the order in which the feature appeared in
the original survey.
4.4.1 Survey results
Returned surveys were consolidated by location to prevent a single plant or group with a high
number of respondents from biasing the results. Rank ordering the results of a survey such as this
can be accomplished in a number of ways, none of which seems ideal. One can "average" the
responses and order them by this average, but it is incorrect to think that two responses of
"neutral" equate to one response of "critical" and one response of "unacceptable". This ordering
scheme works best where the categories do not contain opposites such as critical and
unacceptable. If the scale on which a feature is being rated goes from "pretty good" to "truly
outstanding" averaging may be appropriate.
Figure 4-a below shows the responses to the survey represented graphically by the percentage
rankings for each category. The responses are ordered by the "average" response32, and it is clear
that this ordering leave something to be desired. What the graphical method allows is for an easier
way to examine the results for each question on the survey, and to compare responses to one
another visually. From this representation of this data we can see that there is a clear upper
echelon of self described customer needs.
If there is some automation in the system The system can be operated manually in the event of a
system malfunction.
The system minimizes safety risks.
The system reliably delivers loads on time.
The system provides accurate information to the shipping/receiving docks regarding car contents.
The system minimizes the possibilities for handling damage.
The system provides a smooth and consistent flow of material and racks between the rail car and
production.
The system delivers racks and parts in the exact condition in which they were shipped. (Racks
and parts remain undamaged)
The system provides error checking for car contents. (It prevents you from having different parts
on the ASN than are in the car.)
The system imposes the same constraints on rack return as it does on inbound parts. (The
dunnage bars are fastened, the racks come back in a timely manner, etc.)
The system is easily managed (allocating manpower is a simple task).
The system should have a long useable life.
The systems allows racks to be loaded and unloaded in stacks of 2 or 3 high.
The system reduces the amount and force of load shifting during transit.
Replacement parts for the system can be obtained in a timely manner
32 Critical = 5, Desirable = 4, Neutral = 3, Undesirable = 2 and Unacceptable = 1. So a question to which half of
























The system allows access to any rack in the car at any time during the unloading process. (e.g.
full side access)
The system allows for cheaper, lighter racks to be used.
The system prevents improper cubing. (It is only possible to load racks in the optimal cubing
arrangement.)
The pick up and drop off locations for parts being loaded/unloaded can easily be changed.
The system requires equipment vendors perform service.
The system functions equally well for cars at various different ride heights
The system delivers small batches on a frequent basis.
The system allows palletized goods to be stacked within the car.
The system allows more than one commodity to be shipped in a car.
The system automatically removes racks from the car, and places them in a staging area.
The system automatically removes racks from the car, and delivers them to the linefeed location.
The system reduces congestion on the docks.
The total system transit is minimized
The system minimizes the voids within the car.
The system is flexible enough to accommodate unforeseen production changes and loading
patterns.
The system allows cars to be loaded and unloaded in the shortest possible time.
The system has a single type of load restraint that is usable for all types of loads.
The system should provide excess transportation capacity to cover volume fluctuations.
The system does not increase skilled trades headcount.
The system reduces the total cost of inbound rail shipment.
The system reduces the number of people required to handle rail loads.
The system reduced the number of man-hours required to handle rail loads. (But not necessarily
the total headcount)
The system prevents dunnage loss/detachment.
The system eliminates double handling of racks/parts
The system provides accurate information to the shipping/receiving docks regarding interior car
dimensions.
The system provides accurate information to the shipping/receiving docks regarding required
maintenance.
The system is well received by plant floor personnel.
The system reduces the cost of deviated shipments.
The system minimizes the distance that parts and racks need to be carried.
Training on the system is available to a large number of people at a low cost.
The economics of the system can be easily analyzed and understood.
The system can be maintained by plant skilled trades.
The system allows cars to be serviced (preventative maintenance) while still in operation.
The system provides accurate information to the shipping/receiving docks regarding location of
parts within the car.























The system automatically provides access to the inside of the car (without having to lay a dock
plate)
The system ships no more than one day's worth of parts at a time.




Table 4-2 Customer Needs Survey System Features
Figure 4-a Graphical representation of survey responses (Facing Page)
Graphical Representation of Survey Responses
g Critical 0 Desirable 0 Neutral EI Undesirable U Unacceptable
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4.4.2 Strategic Objectives vs. Stated Customer Needs
The results from the customer needs survey seemed to indicate a conflict between the higher level
strategic goals of the organization and the stated customer priorities. For instance, FPS requires
small batches and frequent deliveries yet this feature ranked very low on customers' lists of needs.
Interestingly, automation ranked at the bottom of the list of customer wants. The low ranking
features from the customer needs survey seemed to all represent a departure from the traditional
way of doing things. Small batches and automated box cars are not part of the current rail
paradigm. One can explain this commonality in two ways. One possibility is that rail users define
as critical those things which are consistent problems today, and that new features rank low
because users are already getting along without them. A customer might think, "How critical can
a feature be if I'm getting along without it today?" Twenty years ago a customer needs survey
might have shown that using computers to track box cars was not a desired feature, yet today it is
considered essential.
A second possible explanation for the low ranking items is that they really would not be of use to
the customers, now or in the future. In the 1980s General Motors saw automation as the key to
future success, but history has not substantiated this view. There were doubtless many GM plant
veterans thinking, "I knew that was a bad idea" as they watched the expensive robotics being
hauled out of the plants. This may be the case with rail car automation, or small batches in big box
cars.
What this customer needs survey highlighted was a potential misalignment of strategic goals and
stated day to day operating needs. Surprisingly, it was not only the plant customers who were
opposed to small batches and automation, but high level managers as well. This potential
misalignment indicated a need to prioritize project objectives. Attempts to involve the members
of a Material Handling Technology Forum33 in the process of prioritizing these needs met with
little success. The general feeling among forum members was that prioritizing these needs without
any design concepts to look at was not a worthwhile task.
Based on the wants of the forum members, study of rail transport was divided into two areas-
equipment and logistics. In the next two chapters we will examine issues of logistics and
equipment in more detail. Although it is clear that these issues are not entirely independent, it is
useful to discuss them separately, and to identify the areas where one impacts the other.
33 The Material Handling Forum is comprised of the heads of material handling in Ford's various organizations as
well as technology development personnel from Ford's Advanced Manufacturing Technology Development Center.
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5. Logistics Issues
In this chapter we will examine the logistics of transporting material between supplier and
assembly plant by rail. We will begin by examining the detailed process by which individual racks
of material are move through plants, and how box cars are moved from origin to destination. We
will then take a higher level look at the box car movement process and characterize this process in
the time domain to learn where box cars are spending most of their time. We will also discuss how
in-plant material flow affects the logistics of box car movement. Finally, We will examine a pricing
model which attempts to predict the cost of a move to Ford based on the parameters describing
that move.
5.1 Process Flows
Rail shipment can be broken down into two separate processes: movement of the rail cars, and
movement of the full and empty racks. The process for moving rail cars includes navigating the
rail network from supplier to customer plants, the movement of cars into and out of repair yards,
the transfer of cars from one origin pool to another, and the delays cars experience sitting in
various yards. The process for moving full and empty racks includes the time the racks are in
moving or delayed box cars, as well as the flow of materials and racks within the supplier and
customer plants. For the purposes of this study we will focus on those steps in the rail car
movement process which convey full and empty racks between customers and suppliers. Although
we will discuss the implications of moves to repair yards, and transfers between origin pools, we
will not map these processes in detail.
Figure 5-a illustrates a detailed process flow for both rail cars and racks (full and empty). The key
feature of this process flow is the number of "buffers" or steps that require a rail car and its
contents to wait. Note that there is a repeated step in which the rail car is moved from one yard to
the next. In extreme cases this step can happen more than ten times in a given route. Note also
that while this process appears to be relatively straightforward, there are several points of
convergence and divergence where multiple process flows converge. For example, when a box car
is in a yard waiting for a connecting train to arrive, several trains with their various cargoes must
arrive before the process of blocking the rail cars can begin.

Figure 5-a Rail Shipping Process Flow
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5.1.1 Box Car Movement Processes
As can be seen in Figure 5-a above, the process of moving rail cars is a simple one. A car begins
as a part of a series of cars located in a plant- the origin plant. These cars are then pulled by a
locomotive into a nearby rail yard at a predetermined time. The cars are then sorted by
destination. (i.e. all of the cars going to Atlanta are grouped together, and separated from the cars
going to other destinations.) Each group of cars then waits for a connecting train to arrive. The
cars are then coupled to the connecting train and pulled to the next yard in their route. The cars
are then sorted by destination, and the process repeats. This repeats until the car is delivered into
the destination plant.
The detailed box car process flow shown above can be grouped into six major process steps34
* Supplier Loading: The period when a supplier has a rail car spotted at his rail dock, and can
be loading parts into the rail car or removing empty racks from the car. Note that a car may be
in the "supplier loading" stage for several hours, even if the actual loading and unloading of
the car takes only an hour.
* Moving Loaded: Once the car is removed from the supplier's plant by a railroad it enters the
"moving loaded" phase. During this part of the process, the rail car contains racks loaded with
parts destined for a supplier and is being moved along a route from supplier to customer. Not
all of the time in this step of the process is spent actually moving. Much of the time is spent
waiting in switching yards for connecting trains.
* Delivered Loaded: When the car is delivered to the customer's rail yard and is available for
use by the customer, it is considered "delivered loaded". A car may wait in this stage for
several days until the customer requests a particular car be pulled into the plant. This stage
represents a buffer at the customer location.
* Customer Unloading: Once a rail car is spotted into the customer's plant it remains there for
a fixed length of time during which the customer may unload the full racks and reload empty
34 The terminology for these steps comes from the rail car status designations in the TRRIPS system, which tracks
rail cars along their routes.
racks into the car. As with "supplier loading", the actual time required to unload and load a
rail car may be much less than the amount of time the car spends in the plant available to be
loaded and unloaded.
* Moving Empty: This step is simply the return of empty racks from customer to supplier and
has the same characteristics as the moving loaded phase, although the duration of this step is
typically longer than that of "moving loaded".
* Delivered Empty: This is the comparable step to delivered loaded for the return of racks.
Cars with empty racks will sit in a supplier's yard until the supplier plant requests that a given
car be spotted into the plant, and the cycle begins again.
It is important to note that within each of these larger aggregated process steps there are several
delays which represent wasted time. Nonetheless, we can gain some insight by examining the
relative lengths of the aggregated process steps. Figure 5-b below shows the distribution of rail
cars within these six steps for the stamping and engine rail car fleets. Because the size of each of
these fleets does not change on a daily or weekly basis, the percentage of cars in each step is the
same as the percentage of the total round trip time that a given car spends in each step.3
35 Ergodicity tells us that the percentage of time spent in a given step is the same as the percentage of box cars in
that step, assuming a closed system.
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Figure 5-b Status Distribution by % of Fleet
5.1.2 In Plant Material and Rack Processes
Within Ford there is no one standard process for conveying goods and racks between production
and the rail docks. The process flow in Figure 5-a above shows the most generic description of
what happens when racks are removed from a rail car, and how racks get loaded back into the rail
car. In reality, each plant manages these processes differently depending on the local management
focus, layout, and production schedules. At a high level we can categorize these processes into
two types: closely coupled and movement decoupled. The difference lies in the amount of
material sorting and buffering between the rail car and the production point of use.
Closely coupled rail flow:
In a plant where the rail cars and production are closely coupled, racks are taken from the rail car,
and placed directly into a line feed area or machine. Typically this process is done by one operator
with a fork truck. Material is not placed into any buffer other than the line side material storage.
In assembly plants with closely coupled material flow, the full racks of a given commodity are
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same car. Because a fork truck can only carry one or two racks at a time, the movement distances
must be small for a closely coupled flow to be efficient. This requires that the rail car be spotted
as close as possible to the line feed location or point of use.
Notice that in a closely coupled system, the type of rack in the box car is always the same. In the
example shown in Figure 5-c, fascia racks never go into the car that delivered stampings and vice
versa. This implies that a given car will return to the location from which it was shipped. Suppose
that both a plant supplying engines and an assembly plant receiving those engines had tightly
coupled systems. In such case a given rail car would become "captive" to the route between the
engine plant and the assembly plant. Plant personnel may be blind to the fact that the same car is




Figure 5-c- Tightly Coupled Material Flow in the Lorain Assembly Plant
Movement Decoupled Material Flow:
In the closely coupled system described above, the movement distances are small, and there is no
buffering between the rail cars and the line feed locations. In systems which are what we will call
"movement decoupled" the distances over which material is moved are typically large, and there
are often buffers or staging areas for material between the rail car and the line feed location. In






depend on the particular commodity and the availability of floor space at the time of unloading. It
is not unusual to have a fork truck driver unload material from the rail car onto a series of tow
dollies which transport the material over a long distance to the point of use or to a storage
location.
Because a movement decoupled system includes in process buffers and separates the rail cars
from the point of material use, it is not unusual to see one commodity (or type of rack) get
unloaded from a rail car and a different type of rack (or commodity) get loaded back into the car.
For example, the Buffalo Stamping plant might unload empty door panel racks returning from the
St. Thomas assembly plant from a rail car, and load full body side racks destined for Oakville back
in the same rail car. This implies that any given rail car is not likely to remain "captive" to a given




















Figure 5-d Movement Decoupled Material Flow in the Buffalo Stamping Plant
Notice that in Figure 5-d, rail car "A" was brought into the stamping plant containing empty




for the Atlanta assembly plant. Rail car "B" is being unloaded and reloaded in the reverse pattern.
These rail cars will not naturally become captive to a given route, but rather they tend to move to
various destinations. For this to occur without any major management intervention, there can not
be features which make one car suitable for only one type of rack or commodity. (i.e. both cars A
and B must be able to carry Windstar or Taurus racks.)
The distinction between closely coupled and movement decoupled material flow has two
implications when considering modifications to the rail system and to box cars. First, we notice
that certain commodities traveling on certain routes generate naturally captive box cars. If we
suggest a modification that would make a box car unique in some way, we would look to
implement this modification on naturally captive cars. To implement it on cars that were
interchangeable would introduce scheduling and equipment capacity constraints into a system that
already lacks sufficient capacity3 6. Secondly, the material handling challenges of unloading to a
unique line feed mechanism are likely to be more significant than those of unloading to a




Rail pricing is done primarily by negotiating the price on a route by route basis. According to one
rail company, the price of a given route is determined by two major components: the train/engine
cost and the car cost. The train and engine cost includes the cost of crews, fuel, maintenance of
both locomotives and the track system, corporate overhead, and the logistics cost for managing
unique or dedicated cars. The car cost includes the cost of car depreciation and maintenance, any
new car purchase costs, and required engineering costs. It is interesting to note that the railroads
claim to price based on availability. If there is an excess of 60 foot box cars, and a shortage of 86
foot cars then the cost of a move in an 86 foot car will include the cost to fabricate a new car.
This implies that the cost of rail transportation to Ford is dependent on what other rail shippers
36 We will discuss the issue of fleet capacity at the end of this chapter.
are doing. Given the current shortage of 86 foot cars, this implies that moves in 60 foot cars
should be cheaper on a normalized basis. The rail company also stated that volume discounts are
offered for routes with a higher number of box cars per day.
What follows is an analysis of the prices that Ford is currently paying for all of its North American
rail routes, excluding certain destinations in Mexico.37 We begin with the hypothesis that the cost
of rail transport between an origin and a destination is a function of four variables:
* Distance between origin and destination as measured in miles
* Duration of the move as measured in days
* Weight of the shipment in hundreds of pounds
* Volume of traffic moving along the given route (in box cars per day)
Regression analysis of route pricing based on these variables for both 86 foot and 60 foot cars
yields only two of significance- the length and duration of the route. This runs counter to the
railroad's assertion that weight and volume play a role in pricing decisions.38 Regressions on the
two significant variables yield the following results39:
Equation 5-a For 86 foot cars:
Cost per box car on a given route = $800 + $1.50/mile + $75/day
(t-stats) (9.08) (13.52) (3.60)
(R2=0.644)
37 In many cases, Ford's rail pricing data base does not include information such as mileage for Mexican routes.
38 The regression yielded the following for 86 foot cars:
650 + 2.00*miles + 130*days -0.02 length*day + 0.00 * hundred lbs - 3.05 * box cars per day
(3.54) (6.69) (2.48) (-0.93) (0.92) (-0.43)
And the following for 60 foot cars:
-220 + 3.50*miles + 275*days -0.40 length*day + 0.00 * hundred lbs + 50* box cars per day
(-0.35) (4.16) (2.00) (-1.29) (0.54) (0.59)
39 All cost data have been disguised
Equation 5-b For 60 foot cars:
Cost per box car on a given route = $675 + $2.00/mile + $75/day
(t-stats) (3.31) (6.18) (1.85)
(R2 = 0.670)
From these regressions we can conclude a few things. First there does appear to be a lower
average fixed cost for the plentiful 60 foot cars. It is interesting to note that the per mile cost of
transportation in 60 foot cars is higher than for 86 foot cars. One possible explanation for this is
that 60 foot cars have historically carried heavier goods such as engines. In fact, many heavy
commodities can only be shipped in 60 foot cars, because an 86 foot car filled with the commodity
would exceed the weight limits on the existing track system. The average weight of a shipment in
a 60 foot car today is 104,000 lb. whereas the average weight in an 86 foot car is only 33,000 lb.
The most likely reason for this is that the railroads used to price the 60 foot cars higher on a per
mile basis due to the greater weight, but that current pricing methods substitute car length in lieu
of load weight.
Note that the coefficient for the number of days transit is only $75 per day. This implies that the
savings to be gained from reducing the transit time are small relative to the total cost. If FPS does
drive transit times down, the savings in transportation will be small. The savings on a per mile
basis can only be achieved through resourcing of parts to different supplier plants to alter the
miles each part must be transported. Ford is currently investigating this possibility using a logistics
modeling approach.
5.3 Equipment Capacity and Reliability Performance
5.3.1 How the fleet is sized
The number and distribution of rail cars allocated to Ford service by origin plant is determined
based on the peak shipping volumes from the given origin . The motivation for this is that during
40 Ford analysts perform this analysis. This is in contrast to General Motors, where the railroads determine fleet
capacity based on GM's stated demand
periods of sustained high demand there are sufficient rail cars to avoid deviating some shipments
into trucks. Because of the long distances many rail normal parts are shipped and because of the
high cubic volumes being moved, truck deviations are often very costly. In most cases there are
actually more cars assigned to a given origin than peak volumes would indicated are necessary,
yet plant and logistics personnel consistently feel that there is a "shortage of rail cars" particularly
among 86ft box cars.
This seeming inconsistency can be explained by looking at the reliability and maintenance of the
box car fleets. Based on data for Ford stamping plants from October through December the
percentage of cars out of service for unscheduled maintenance is 8% (+/-1.23% at a 95%
confidence level). All box cars are supposed to be removed from service once every 18 months
for minor preventative maintenance. Suppose this maintenance removes a car from service for a
week. If the proper maintenance schedule is followed, 1.28% of the fleet would be out of service
for this maintenance at any given time. In addition to these minor maintenance services, all cars
are supposed to be fully reconditioned every seven years. Suppose this takes an average of one
month. Thus an average of 1.19% of the rail fleet will be out of service for major reconditioning
at any given time. Between these two types of service, a total of 2.47% of the rail fleet will be
unavailable at any given time.
To see what these numbers mean in terms of the effective capacity of the rail fleet, let us look at
stamping as an example. First we need to understand how the size of a stamping plant's rail fleet
is determined. To determine the number of cars required at a Ford stamping plant the daily
volumes and transit times are calculated for all routes originating the given stamping plant. The
daily volumes are based on the peak sustained volumes coming out of the stamping plant.41 Each
assembly plant has a peak demand, and the stamping plant's rail fleet is assigned assuming all
41The peak demand from a given assembly plant is based on the line rate at which the assembly plant produces,
and the maximum contractually allowable overtime. Typically a plant running a two shift operation can require the
hourly workforce on each shift to work 10 hours per day during the week, and 8 hours for two out of every three
Saturdays. This equates to an average of 110.7 hours per week of total work time, and 100.7 hours per week when
break time is removed. An assembly plant with a line rate of 50 jobs per hour running a two shift operation would
have an effective capacity of 5030 vehicles per week. A stamping plant supplying hoods to this plant would need to
have enough rail cars available to ship 5030 hoods per week.
assembly plants require peak demand at the same time. Historically, many plants will run at or
near capacity in March and April due to seasonal patterns of vehicle demand. The size of the fleet
also depends on the transit times between the stamping plant and its various customers. To
determine the round trip time to use when calculating fleet size, the standard one way transit time
is doubled, and three days are added for "dwell time." This is to allow for time that the rail car sits
idle in the customer and stamping plant yards. We can express this approach in the following
formula:
Total Average Transit = (Loaded transit time * 2) + 3 days dwell
Equation 5-c
As mentioned above, the actual number of cars assigned to all of Ford's stamping plants is
actually greater than the theoretical number that should be required based on the approach above.
We notice that the formula for calculating the required fleet size does not include any allowance
for cars out of service or undergoing maintenance. Let us assume that the maintenance schedules
are followed, and that maintenance is evenly spaced through time so that there are always the
same number of cars out of service for maintenance. (i.e. there is no variance in the percentage of
the fleet out of service for scheduled maintenance.) If we assume that the percentage of cars on
bad order status is a random variable with mean of 8%, we can calculate the effective service rate
of the fleet during peak demand as follows:
Of the 3266 cars actually assigned to the Ford stamping fleet, 2.47% are supposed to be out of
service at any given time, so the number of available cars is actually:
3266 x (1-.0247) = 3185
At any given time, an average of 8% of these cars will be bad. The actual number will vary.
Assume that the bad order cars are independently distributed, and that down time is one day.
Hence, we can use the binomial distribution and estimate the variance in the number of bad cars
as:
np(1-p)
where n=number of cars in the fleet
p=percentage of bad cars at any one time.
Variance = 3185 x 0.08 x (1-0.08) = 234 cars
sigma = sqrt(234) = 15.3 cars
What then is the effective size of our fleet? If we set the service level at 95%, using the normal
approximation to the binomial, then the effective size of our fleet is 2907, which is 11% less than
the 3266 we though we had. We determine the effective fleet size as follows:
Total cars available - cars out for maintenance - average on bad order - 1.645 sigma bad order
3266 - 81 - 252 - 1.645 * 15.3 = 2907
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Figure 5-e - Service Levels vs. Fleet Size in Ford Stamping Plants
We clearly do not have the 3504 cars required to assure a 95% service level during peak demand.
Figure 5-e shows how service level varies with the number of box cars assigned within the Ford
stamping fleet. The three data sets represent the service performance for various levels of demand.
100% of peak demand equates to all assembly plants running at capacity. 80% of peak demand
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80% and 90% of peak demand, the existing rail fleet performs at service levels of essentially
100%. This implies that the probability of having a shortage of cars when the demand is less than
90% is essentially zero. However when demand rises above 90% of peak, the service level drops
dramatically. If all assembly plants were running at 100% of capacity, the probability of having a
shortage of rail cars is essentially one. The fleet would need to have 3550 cars to ensure
essentially 100% service levels at 100% of peak demand.
Although there is some seasonality in assembly plant operating patterns, it is more often the case
that some assembly plants are running at peak capacity year round, and some are running with no
overtime and several weeks of shut down each year. Thus we expect the actual demand level to
be greater than 80% but less than 100% with a seasonal variability, and that there will be box car
shortages as demand increases.
It is rarely the case that a given plant must deviate shipments to truck mode due to a lack of box
cars. This implies that there is some correction going on to make more box cars available relative
to the above analysis. In fact, this correction includes a failure to maintain box cars on the
scheduled basis and an unwillingness to take cars out of service for repairs that are not show
stoppers. (We will quantify this effect in the next chapter.) Not surprisingly, this leads to a poorly
maintained fleet of 86 foot box cars. As we will see in later sections, maintenance related issues
are one of the top concerns of rail users.
From the findings in this chapter we can draw three major conclusions regarding the logistics of
rail transport. First, we see that there is a great deal of waste in the rail system. (i.e. time parts and
equipment spend idle rather than moving from origin to destination.) Some of this waste arises
from the need of the railroads to schedule in such a manner as to maximize their equipment
utilization, while some arises from a lack of incentives to reduce certain wastes. (e.g low emphasis
on rack return transit times.) Second, we see that equipment related decisions including the
construction of specialized box cars will impact the logistics of the rail system and likely increase
the level of waste. Unfortunately the third finding is that a regression based pricing model of rail
transport does not aid us greatly in determining the impacts of changes to rail logistics on the
price Ford pays for rail service.
6. Equipment Design Issues
The issues of maintenance and fleet capacity are common to both the logistics of the rail system
and the related equipment. In the previous chapter we alluded to regularly scheduled maintenance.
In this chapter we will examine how "regularly" this maintenance takes place, and the impact on
fleet performance. We will then examine the issue of the impact of creating unique equipment
which is dedicated to a specific origin-destination pair, as a highly automated system is likely to
be. From this we will make some inferences as to where it might be appropriate to design special
purpose rail equipment.
6.1 Equipment Maintenance
Much of the frustration with railroad equipment centers around issues of regular maintenance.
Plants that have instituted regular maintenance programs on box car doors claim a significant
improvement in door functioning. It is widely accepted that production equipment will not
function properly without sufficient preventive maintenance, and box cars are no different.
Figure 6-a below shows the status of the box cars in the stamping fleet (all box cars allocated to
Ford stamping plants) with regard to preventive maintenance and major reconditioning.
Preventive maintenance is supposed to be performed every 18 months and includes lubrication
and adjustment of the doors, as well as other mechanisms in the box car. The major
reconditioning is supposed to occur every seven years, and consists of a major rebuild of the car.
Clearly a large portion of the fleet is overdue for one or both of these services.
Preventive Maintenance
Status
















Figure 6-b Stamping Box Car Bad
Order Status
Figure 6-b shows the "bad order" status of the cars in the stamping fleet. In railroad parlance, a
car on bad order status has been removed from service for some repair. A car with doors that can
not be opened, or are very difficult to open, may be put on bad order status. Similarly a car with a
broken cushioning unit may be placed on bad order status depending on how bad the problem is.
There are no hard and fast rules for when to put a car on bad order status. It follows then that the
percentage of cars on bad order status is a function not only of the state of repair of the fleet, but














order status for less serious problems. If there are very few spare cars a plant is more likely to
"limp along" with a poorly functioning car than to take a car out of service for repair. This trend
is evidenced by the comparison of the stamping fleet (which consists of 86 foot cars which are in
high demand) with the engine fleet (mostly 60 foot cars which are in plentiful supply.)


























Figure 6-d Engine Fleet Bad Order
Status
Figure 6-d shows the percentage of the engine fleet on bad order status. Note that although a
higher percentage of the engine box cars are up to date for their preventive maintenance and
reconditioning, there are a higher number of cars on bad order. One engine plant rail dock
supervisor indicated that all box cars are inspected every shift for problems, and tagged for bad
order if problems are found. This is in contrast to the stamping plant descriptions of placing a car
on bad order only if the door can not be opened.
As noted above FPS requires reliable processes and zero defects. If rail is to remain a viable mode
of shipment, the equipment maintenance issues contributing to unreliable access to delivered
goods, and to transit related damaged goods must be resolved.
6.2 Cost of uniqueness
6.2.1 When is a car unique
If we are considering modifications to the physical structure of a rail car, we must attempt to gage
the cost of this uniqueness. In some situations, the additional cost of managing a unique car is low
(for cars that become naturally captive as described above.). In others additional managerial effort
will need to be made to track and route the unique cars correctly, with some associated cost. It is
worth noting that all cars that contain either full or empty racks are to some degree unique. A box
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If we were to design significant uniqueness into a new box car, we would not only have greater
management costs but we would need to size the fleet to provide the desired service level. Using a
similar approach to that in section 5.3, we would optimize fleet size based on failure and repair
data for the new design to attain a given service level. The example below illustrates how the
number of box cars that must be kept on hand as "safety stock" varies with the level of uniqueness
and the demand variability.
Suppose that we have one stamping plant supplying ten assembly plants. For simplicity assume
that each assembly plant has a demand of 100 + 15 box cars per day worth of material. If any box
car can be shipped to any assembly plant, then the demand for box cars will be: 1000 ±+ 415. If,
however, each plant requires a unique box car, then the demand will be 1000 + 150. If we want to
protect for demand to the 1.645 sigma level (95% service level) we would need a total of 1021
box cars in the first case, and 1246 in the second case. The effect of car uniqueness depends on
the variability of demand since unique cars can't be substituted with other cars. When selecting a
pilot route for a unique car design we will want to choose one with low demand variability, and
closely coupled material flow at both ends.
In this chapter we have seen that regularly scheduled maintenance does not often occur on
schedule. This finding may explain why so many rail customers were dissatisfied with the
condition of rail cars, and why issues like door reliability and cushioning unit performance were of
such concern. We have also shed some light on the apparent contradiction between the method of
sizing the rail fleet (which first appears to allocate more cars than needed) and the perceived
"shortage" of 86 foot box cars. Because the fleet sizing methods do not take into account the
variability in equipment reliability and the loss of fleet capacity to preventive maintenance, the
total number of box cars allocated to Ford service will not suffice during periods of high demand.
Finally, we have seen that if we are going to implement specialized equipment there are certain
conditions under which the impact on rail logistics will be minimal.
6Lz
7. Recommendations, Reflections, and Conclusions
In this chapter recommendations for equipment designs and logistics system analyses will be
presented. We will then reflect upon the pros and cons of applying a product design oriented
customer needs analysis to an internal development project. Finally we will conclude with a high
level summary of the findings of this research and their implications.
7.1 Equipment Design Concept Recommendations
The following are equipment design concepts for bringing rail shipping into closer alignment with
Ford's strategic objectives, as well as for addressing the identified customer needs. All of these
concepts received favorable feedback from plant personnel, and were generated with the input of
representatives of Norfolk Southern and TTX-Drayco.
7.1.1 RF Tag scanners
In the customer needs analysis we identified that accurate and error-proof information systems for
identifying car contents were a top want. We have also identified that from the point of view of
strategies like ILVS and FPS, accurate information is a must. Plant personnel describe the
inaccuracies in the record of car contents coming from human error or lack of willingness to input
any information at all. A box car number might by typed into the shipping system incorrectly, or
an assembly plant might not take the time to identify the type of rack being returned, or mistake
empty left hand racks for empty right hand racks.
One concept for addressing this issue involves the use of radio frequency (RF) tags attached to
the shipping racks, with RF scanners mounted dockside near box car door openings. A fork truck
driver loading racks into a box car would drive by the scanner on his way into the car, and the
contents of the rack would be added to the contents list for that box car. Box cars themselves all
have RF tags mounted on their sides, called Automated Equipment Identification (AEI) tags. The
dockside scanner could read these tags as the box cars were pulled into the plant, add the cars'
contents to the plant inventory as the racks were unloaded, and refill the car as new racks were
loaded.
Existing "cubing" software can provide material handlers with a layout of the optimal
arrangement of goods in a conveyance, and store this layout. If this information can be compiled
automatically when a supplier is loading the box car, an unloading sequence and map can be
created to facilitate ILVS shipment of parts. If a system like this were installed in a plant with a
highly automated material movement system, such as the Twin Cities assembly plant, it could be
integrated with existing material replenishment systems.
The pros of this concept include the ability to generate bills of lading and advance shipping notices
automatically. Although the process differs from plant to plant, all supplier plants have a process
for tagging racks of outgoing material when they are produced, and then transferring part
information to a shipping notice. This requires the time of the material handlers and/or material
control personnel, and has great potential for error. Automating this process would both save time
and increase accuracy.
The drawbacks of this system include the risk of malfunction that customers fear. Current RF tags
lack the range to function in this application, but development of longer range tags is underway.
The largest barriers to implementing this concept may lie in the initial investment costs for
equipping a large rack fleet and installing readers. As costs for the longer range tags become more
clear, the cost of installing an RF tag on a rack should not only be compared to the cost savings of
reduced labor and inaccuracies, but to the costs saved by eliminating the single use bar coded tags
currently printed to identify material.
7.1.2 Improved door designs
As discussed above door maintenance was considered a major issue by all of the plant personnel
and by some of the staff personnel as well. Discussions with plant and railroad representatives
indicate that the two major sources of door damage arise from lack of proper maintenance and
improper operation of the doors. When a door is not properly adjusted and lubricated, the force
required to open it may exceed the strength of an average material handler. This leads to using the
fork of a fork lift truck to force the door open, which worsens problems of adjustments. One
solution to this problem is to perform maintenance on the doors at more regularly scheduled
intervals. A second solution is to design out the need for lubrication and adjustments in the doors
themselves.
Designs exist for less maintenance intensive, more robust doors. One type, the top hung sliding
door, is currently in service on some Conrail cars with positive results. This type of door slides on
fully enclosed rails at the top of the door. The full enclosure prevents dirt and debris from getting
in the rails, and keeps lubricants in the moving mechanisms. The bottom of the door rides in
guides which prevent the bottom of the door from swinging away from the car, but which carry
none of the load of the door. If a ford truck driver hits the door from the inside of the car, the
bottom of the door will pop out of the guides (which can be reset with relative ease) instead of
damaging the door and its alignment.
The advantage of this door design is that it reduces serious damage to the door upon impact, and
that it requires less maintenance. One disadvantage of this type of door is that it does not provide
as tight a seal to the car as the standard "plug" type door.42 Norfolk Southern engineers are
currently attempting to develop better seals for sliding doors. If maintenance continues to be
performed at or below the required level to keep equipment functioning, installing new doors may
have little or no impact other than to slightly reduce the amount of preventive maintenance on box
car doors, while requiring the same amount of corrective maintenance. Stated differently, when
rail users say, "We have door maintenance problems" a distinction needs to be made between
door problems, and maintenance problems. The slider door may be a solution to the door
problem, but not to the maintenance problem.
Composite doors were also suggested as way to reduce door damage. The premise is that if the
doors are lighter, material handlers will be less likely to use excessive and damaging force to open
them. The primary downside of composite doors is the cost. Not only is the initial fabrication
cost higher than for a steel door, but the cost of repair where repair is even an option is high.
42 A plug type door actually compresses a seal against the door opening in the box car to provide a weather tight
seal. The mechanics of this motion are in part what make plug doors require adjustment. A slider door in contrast
simply slides over the opening in the box car.
7.1.3 Containerized loads with automated transfer
One concept that met with enthusiasm at more technologically sophisticated plants and great
skepticism at less technologically advanced plants was the idea of shipping in ISO-like containers.
These containers would be automatically transferred from flat cars to in-plant use. Either standard
ISO containers (20 or 40 feet long) or smaller custom built containers would come into the plant
on container (flat) cars. These containers would be transferred laterally off the flat cars onto the
dock. There they would either be opened and unloaded automatically or transferred to the point
of use within the plant.
TTX envisioned a system where a chain drive system was installed in the floor of the container.
When both doors on the container were opened, goods could be through loaded or unloaded with
the aid of the drive system. Once removed from the container, the goods could be laterally
transferred to tow dollies pulled by AGVs to be delivered to line location.43
This system has the advantage (over modifying existing 86 foot box cars) that ISO containers are
in relatively plentiful supply. Because containers have smaller and simpler doors, they are less
prone to maintenance problems. If containers even smaller than the smallest current container are
used there is the possibility of replacing racks with small containers. By containerizing the loads,
parts from different suppliers can be shipped in smaller batches on a more frequent basis than if a
supplier must fill an entire box car before shipping. Although this ranked low on the stated
customer needs, small batches is part of the longer term strategy inherent in FPS. If done well,
this system has the potential to reduce the material handling labor cost component of the total
cost of rail.
The disadvantages of this system include the need for more dockside space, the loss of cube
relative to box cars, the risk of lost production due to system downtime, and the potential to
43 A system incorporating many of the features of this concept exists at the Twin Cities assembly plant. Material is
moved on wooden slave pallets through a series of driven rollers.
increase total cost at the expense of reduced labor cost. This system by itself does not address
issues of information accuracy, but the RF tag concept could be integrated to address this issue.
Major plant equipment investments are likely to be required. If this option is pursued further a
thorough cost study addressing the categories of total cost as outlined in section 3.3.2 is essential.
7.1.4 Preventive Maintenance Schedules and Equipment
As described in section 6.1, preventive maintenance schedules must be adhered to if rail is to
remain a viable mode of shipment. Not only should maintenance be performed on a well crafted
schedule, but devices that assist in performing P.M. should be seriously considered. One example
has to do with the fluid cushioning units used to reduce the impacts of coupling cars. These
devices are essentially fluid shock absorbers. As with any shock absorber, if all of the fluid has
leaked out, there is almost no damping effect. Current cushioning units have no means for
checking fluid level. Keystone has developed a cushioning unit that can be monitored for low fluid
levels and can send a signal indicating the need for maintenance. Insofar as devices such as this
allow for the more proactive maintenance policies such as those in some engine plants, they
should be considered for installation in light of the issues of FPS, ILVS, and the like.
7.2 Logistics System Recommendations
7.2.1 Further characterize time and cost distributions
The process flows in 5.1 illustrate the distribution of time in the rail system. The characterizations
within this thesis describe this distribution at a rather highly aggregated level. Although it is useful
to know that the rack return transit is greatly in excess of the loaded transit, we would like to
better understand the reasons for this. Future study of this matter should attempt to characterize
the rail shipping process in the time domain at a more detailed level than is done herein. For
example if we knew how much time a box car spent actually moving along rail lines, versus
waiting in a classification yard, we would be better able to identify areas for eliminating waste
from the rail process.
In section 3.3.2 we discussed the components of cost that figure into the total cost of rail
shipping. Each of these costs can be mapped to a step in our rail process flow. By identifying the
distribution of these costs we would better know where to focus reduction efforts.
7.2.2 Continuous improvement teams to reduce waste
Once we have identified the cost and time distributions within the rail system, we need to put
systems in place to begin the process of removing waste from this system. There have been single
instances of representatives from Ford and the railroads working together to develop "fast trains"
which eliminate much of the waste, but these have been isolated instances. If waste is to be
removed from the rail system in a sustainable manner for the railroads, these teams must consist
not only of representatives from transportation procurement and a single railroad, but from rail
served plants, from short and long haul railroads, from logistics planning, from FPS, and the like.
If Ford truly wants a more lean transportation system then the metrics and incentives must reflect
this. If we continue to pressure railroads for faster loaded transits while ignoring return transit
times, we should not be surprised when we get return transits that are twice as long as loaded
transits.
7.2.3 Decision Making Processes
As discussed in section 3.3.2, the decision making process for truck vs. rail needs to be better
defined in light of new strategic objectives. A rational decision making process requires
prioritization of strategic directives. Situations will arise where trade-offs must be made, and
analysts will need a guide for these decisions. For example, if there are two transportation
options, one of which exceeds the six day order to delivery window, but which saves $500 per
move, which one should be chosen? To make decisions such as these, Ford needs to know which
constraints must always be binding, and how to compare options for non-binding constraints. This
may imply setting thresholds (e.g. We will pay an extra $200 per move to stay within the six day
window, but if the savings are greater than $200, we will protect the assembly plant sequence
with inventory.)
A logical next step in refining the decision making process would be to evaluate the proposed cost
model in a variety of different transportation situations. One approach to this would be to plug
various scenarios into the model and determine what shipment characteristics most greatly
influence the truck vs. rail decision. Statistical analysis of the results of these scenarios
characterize those shipment characteristics which most influenced the truck vs. rail decision.
A second approach would be to restate each element of the cost model in terms of shipment
characteristics. For example, transit cost might be a function of distance traveled, cubic volume,
weight, and the like. We can use regression analyses similar to those in section 5.2.1 to determine
the specific nature of these functions. With this data in hand, we could describe the cost of
shipment purely as a function of shipment characteristics, and see which components contributed
most greatly to the total cost, and where the breakpoints lie. This would allow us to provide
logistics analysts with sound cost decision making tools.
7.3 Reflections on Internally Applied Customer Needs Analyses
This thesis describes one attempt to apply the principles of product design methodology to a
project within a company. The application of a structured analysis method to the problem of rail
transportation proved to be useful in some areas, but insufficient in others. Following are the
author's thoughts on the benefits and drawbacks of applying a product design methodology to an
internal development project.
7.3.1 How customer voice can better define the problem
The distinction between symptoms and underlying problems may be a difficult one to draw.
System dynamics models of complex systems illustrate the non-obvious nature of many underlying
problems. By soliciting and documenting "customer" (stakeholder) input, the underlying problems
can be better defined. In the case discussed in this thesis, customer input was initially sought on
the subject of box car design for automation, because the project was defined to address problems
of labor costs and automated material flow. Discussions with various customers of rail pointed
out that concerns over system wide logistics and existing equipment reliability overrode the desire
for automation technology. As a result of this input the project scope was broadened to include
logistics as well as equipment.
The results of the customer needs survey indicated a rift between the stated strategic goals of the
organization (lean manufacturing a la FPS, for example) and the stated wants of the rail users
(where small batches and frequent deliveries ranked low). Although the use of a documented
customer needs analysis brought this dilemma to light, the traditional product design methodology
does not tell us how to evaluate this type of conflict. In product design, the fundamental
assumption is that no one knows better than the customer what he or she needs. Although it may
be a product developer's job to elucidate latent needs, it is not often the case that a product is
"forced" on a customer. This assumption does not seem to hold for projects within a company
that challenge existing paradigms.
In the case of railroad equipment and logistics design, it seems that many of the customers were
asking for improvements to the status quo, or incremental innovation. Yet the high level strategic
objectives seem to demand more radical change. The product development process does not tell
us much about how to develop radically different systems that meet with operational resistance by
challenging long held paradigms. True, we may be able to use information gathered from
customers to incorporate features into radically different systems to "ease the pain" of a totally
new way of doing things, but we run the risk of alienating our customers. For example, if all of
our customers said, "We really do not want a system that forces us to ship in small batches, but
we really do want more reliable doors" and we gave them a system that had reliable doors but
forced small batches, how much credibility would we have when approaching these same
customers and seeking their input on a subsequent project?
When a customer's input is actively sought in a formalized process such as a customer needs
analysis, there may be an implied contract to make a good faith effort to meet the customer's
needs. Failing to do so (or worse actively going against the customer's needs) threatens the open
dialog between those responsible for developing new systems and those who will have to live with
the changes. Although there is a risk of alienating customers by failing to address their needs, the
customer needs analysis process may have the benefit of bringing previously unraised issues to the
attention of those developing and decreeing the strategic goals.
7.3.2 Customer hierarchy and definition is important
Because the application of a product design/customer needs methodology to development
projects within a company may highlight conflicts between strategic objectives and operational
wants, it may be prudent to identify a hierarchy of customers before beginning the analysis. For
example, we might want to identify up front that meeting the strategic objectives of the Ford
Production System is our top need. Then a customer needs analysis could approach the
operational customers with the clear understanding that small batches and frequent shipments are
the way of the future, but that user input is required to figure out how to best implement this
aspect of FPS.
Existing product design methodologies tell us to begin with a mission statement that explicitly
states the objective of our development project. We might have a mission statement that talks
about building a better mousetrap, and we would look to our customers to tell us what "better"
means. If we set our mission to design a better box car, or a better rail logistics system, our
customers may not have a common vision of what "better" means. Product design philosophy
gives us tools for prioritizing customer needs based on the strength and number of customer
sentiments on a given issue.
The underlying assumption here is that we will design our product so as to please the greatest
number of people the most, and that it is acceptable to alienate a small number of customers to
please the many. In other words, there is an assumption that a customer can choose not to buy
our product. In the case of internal development projects, the people we have identified as
customers can not choose to simply not use the resultant product of the design effort. Internal
design projects require the designers to live with the dissatisfied customers. Customers whose
needs have been ignored are going to be unhappy, and potentially destructive to the project
success if a design exacerbates rather than solves their problems.
It is this lack of choice which makes the application of product development methodologies to
intra-company development projects a challenge. One way to address this issue is to determine the
relationships between customers before beginning any customer needs analysis. If we intend to
compile a survey ranking potential system features from critical to unacceptable, we can establish
at the outset the rules for weighing various groups' input. For example, we might say that if a
given system feature is critical to the strategic group, and undesirable to the operations that we
will consider it to be more or less a critical feature. At the same time we might decide that a
feature which is desirable to the strategic group, but unacceptable to the operations group would
be considered basically unacceptable.
The process of deciding in advance how different customers' needs will be weighed would require
assembling a team of representatives from many different functions to negotiate these weightings.
It may be these negotiations which prove to be the most difficult stage of the process. The debates
during such negotiations may bring up fundamental questions like, "Who best knows what the
future of our business will look like- the strategists or the operations people?", and "How and
when do we introduce new and unpopular ways of doing things to our operations?" The
application of a product design methodology to an internal company development project may
help bring many of the underlying issues to light, but does little to suggest ways of resolving these
issues.
7.4 Conclusion
At the outset of this thesis we asked the question, "Why are the logistics and equipment of the
railroads an increasingly poor fit to Ford's needs?" The most general answer to this question
appears to be that rail has not been subjected to the same kinds of continuous improvement efforts
and lean-thinking scrutiny as plant operations and, to some degree, truck transportation.
Examples of this lack of leanness include the large number and size of "buffers" in the rail system
in the form of switching yards; the lack of adherence to preventive maintenance schedules and
practices; the lack of standard operating procedures in making rail transit decisions; and the lack
of discipline in on-time delivery.
Having identified the reason for the poor fit between rail and Ford's new strategies, we sought
ways to improve the fit to capitalize on the advantages of rail. The most obvious way in which we
can improve this fit is by applying lean manufacturing techniques to rail transport. The first step in
doing so requires characterizing the current system. We have seen a characterization of the
current system in the time domain, and have recommended further characterization in the cost
domain. Once the system is characterized, activities that do not contribute to delivering good
parts to assembly plants at the proper time and with the lowest possible cost must be reduced or
eliminated.
Standard operating procedures need to be developed for making truck vs. rail decisions, for
managing the flow of materials and information in the rail system, and for the movement of rail
cars through the rail network. We have discussed one method of standardizing the transportation
mode decision making process, and identified the need for further study of this matter.
At the most general level we conclude that if rail is to remain a viable mode of shipping from




Barnhart and Ratliff, "Modeling Intermodal Routing", Georgia Institute of Technology,
December 1991 COC-91-11
Bhatti, Garg, "Review of Railway Vehicle Performance and Design Criteria", International
Journal of Vehicle Design, Vol. 5, Issue 1-2, January 1984, p.2 3 2 -2 54
Cobb, Chris and Redding, David, "Maintenance Investment Safeguards Capital Outlay",
Railway Gazette International, Vol. 148, No. 2 (February 1992) p. 105-107
Delany, R. "Trends in Logistics and US World Competitiveness", Transportation
Quarterly, Vol. 45, No.1, 1991, p. 19 -4 1
Down, Wise, "Domestic Containerization: Overview of Terminal Design and Operating
Issues", Transportation Research Board State-Of-The-Art Report Issue No. 4, 1986
p. 1 16-122
Draper, Gary, "New Opportunities for Savings in and Evolving Transportation
Environement", National Meeting of AIChE, 1986 Annual Meeting, Paper 92C
Etwell, MJW, "Advances in Rail Wagon Design". Proceedings of the Institution of
Mechanical Engineers Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit, Vol. 204, No. 1, (1990)
p.45-54
Engle, Tom, "Iron Highway Tests Prove Integral Trail Concept", Railway Gazette
International, Vol. 150, No. 5, (May, 1994) p. 295,297+
Frost, William, "Changes in the US Rail Transit Car Manufacturing Industry",
Transportation Research Record, 1984, p. 4-23
Harker, Hong, "Pricing of Track Time in Railroad Operations: An Internal Market
Approach", Transportation Research. Part B: Methodological, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1994,
p.197-212
Hawthorne, Fisher, "Progress in Railway Mechanical Engineering: Cars and Equipment",
Americam Society of Mechanical Engineers Report No. 80-WA/RT-11 Conference Paper,
1980
Hogan, Rey, Faas, "Design of a Smart, Survivable Sensor System for Enhancing the Safe
and Secure Transportation of Hazardous or High Value Cargo on Railroads", Proceeding
of the IEEE/ASME Joint Railroad Conference (1994), p. 14 7 -15 2
Leedham, Sfirakis, Spearin, "Development and Testing of a New Generation Two-Piece
Bulkhead Door", RTD Rail Transportation Proceedings of the 1993 Ride Quality
Conference of the ASME, 1996, p.3 7-51
Marin, Salmeron, "Tactical Design of Rail Freight Networks. Part I: Exact and Heuristic
Methods", European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 90, No. 1, April 1995,
p.26-44
Martland, Little, and Sussman, "Service Management in the Railroad Industry",
Transportation Research Board Conference Proceedings 2, (1994) p. 89-103
Punwami, Swamidas, "Progress in Railroad Freight Car Engineering", RTD Rail
Transportation Proceedings of the 1994 International Mechanical Engineering Congress
and Exposition", p.89-108
Scales, "Design of Hydraulic End-of-Car Cushion Units for Shock Free Train Action",
ASME Rail Transportation Spring Conference Proceedings, 194, p.29-40
Singh, Irani, Punwani, "Truck Suspension Specification Automobile Transport",
Proceedings of the IEEE/ASME Joint Railroad Conference (1994) p. 133-139
Stenger, Beler, "Effective Carrier Marketing Strategies: The Case of the Railroads",
Transportation Journal, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1976, p.63-72
"New Standard Boxcars", Progressive Railroading, Vol. 16, No. 6, 1973
"Linking Car Design to Customer Needs: Engineering, Maintenance Capabilities Enhance
Itel Rail's Position in the Car Leasing Field", Modern Railroads, Vol. 46, No. 4 (1991) p.
35-39
%..j\.r
